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Keep thee far from the man that hath power to kill; so shalt 
thou not doubt the fear of death: and if thou come unto him, 
make no fault, lest he take away thy life presently: 
remember that thou goest in the midst of snares, and that 
thou walkest upon the battlements of cities. 
ECCLESIASTICUS (SIRACH) 9.13 
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1. Introduction 
 
From its violent birth as the surviving portion of a civilization engulfed by invaders to 
its violent death as a lone city overwhelmed by irresistible assault, the Byzantine Empire was 
a state walled against perpetual siege. Byzantine fortifications are a diverse and fascinating 
but also ill-studied subject. Over time, as the empire weathered internal and external warfare, 
its fortified settlements changed and developed to endure the storm. The relationship between 
habitation and fortification is often difficult to discern, and varied greatly from place to place 
and over time. In some places, city walls encompassed a great area, even when only a 
vestigial community remained inside. In others, small hilltop towns found themselves so 
packed with activity that the grand open spaces of their Roman heritage were transformed 
into crowded bazaars. Cities were sometimes divided into upper and lower, other times the 
city relied upon a citadel, all to provide a more defensible refuge while retaining a larger area 
for daily life. 
However, it was the great cities of the empire that boasted the mightiest stone circuits. 
Thessalonica, Nicaea, Antioch, Ancyra and Alexandria were all secured against assault by a 
higher class of ramparts and even when waves of invaders could wash over the lesser 
defenses of the hill towns around them, these cities could hold out against all but the most 
sophisticated and relentless besiegers. The grandest and most impregnable fortifications in 
the medieval world crowned the landward side of the “Queen of Cities” herself, 
Constantinople: a six-kilometer, three-layered masterpiece of military engineering that was 
breached by force only twice in over a millennium.
1
 
                                                 
1
 Edward Luttwak, The Grand Strategy of the Byzantine Empire, (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard 
University Press, 2009), 67-77. 
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Figure 1. The Theosodian Land Walls of Constantinople (artist’s reconstruction) 
http://weaponsandwarfare.com/?p=26940 
 
  
Figure 2. A cross-section of the same walls, showing its three layers 
http://www.flickr.com/photos/21711359@N08/3971839210/in/photostream/ 
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What role did these structures play in Byzantine civilization? Historians have 
disagreed somewhat about the relationship between walls and the cities they enclosed. For 
some, it was primarily positive and protective, and walls are understood to have preserved 
Roman civilization from barbarism. For others, the relationship was negative and 
constrictive: walls are understood to have choked the life out of the classical polis and 
reduced it to a martial husk. For some recent historians, walls are understood as regulatory 
structures used to control commerce, movement and political action. John Haldon, Mark 
Whittow, Wolfgang Liebeschuetz and Cyril Mango have all offered complex analyses of the 
social, economic and political dynamics walls imposed upon cities. 
 But regardless of whether historians see walls as benevolent, toxic, intrusive or some 
combination, almost all historians agree that walls were the product of the imperial state, and 
whether fortifications were gifts, nooses or restraints, all agree that they were imposed upon 
the passive urban body by the imperial state. 
In “Authority in Byzantine Provincial Society, 950-1100,” Leonora Neville contends 
just this, asserting that, “on the balance, it seems the imperial administration should be 
credited with maintaining a monopoly upon fortification.”
2
 In the same vein, Mark Whittow 
argues in “Rural Fortifications in Western Europe and Byzantium, Tenth to Twelfth Century” 
that no equivalent to the private aristocratic fortifications of western medieval Europe 
(castles) existed in the east, and that “the Byzantines clearly regarded most kastra [fortified 
settlements] as essentially imperial or public fortresses.”
3
 
                                                 
2
 Leonora Alice Neville, Authority in Byzantine Provincial Society, 950-1100. (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2004), 44. 
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 Mark Whittow, “Rural Fortifications in Western Europe and Byzantium, Tenth to Twelfth Century”: 
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Historians base this conclusion upon a degree of hard evidence, such as the jealously 
guarded imperial monopoly over wall construction and patronage, and the fact that there are 
few examples of any non-state actors disputing it by claiming to possess some walled 
settlement independently of imperial authority. Historians also argue that the fortification of 
cities transformed autonomously governed population centers into military-administrative 
nucleuses used to control the countryside. This argument goes farther than reducing urban 
communities to a passive position by removing them from the equation entirely. 
 Most Byzantine emperors would have been happy to hear that historians have so 
resoundingly affirmed their sovereignty over city walls. If they indeed held such a monopoly, 
they did not trouble to keep it a secret: Byzantine monarchs widely publicized their special 
relationship with urban defenses, celebrating triumphal entrances through splendid 
ceremonial city gates, unsubtly promoting their patronage of them in propagandistic literature 
and enshrining the emperor’s role as urban protector in political theory, theology and law. 
Walls were understood to be physical embodiments of the political power of the emperor. 
This ideal must have been of small comfort to the craftsmen, merchants and 
landowners of Thessaloniki when they found their city enmeshed in a violent struggle 
between the armies of two imperial claimants jockeying for the throne. In The Alexiad, Anna 
Komnena describes how, after being defeated by her father, the future emperor, Alexios 
Komnenos, his rival, Basilakios, fled to the city of Thessaloniki. 
When they reached Thessaloniki, the townspeople immediately received Basilakios 
but barred the gates to [Alexios]. But even then my father did not relax: far from 
taking off his breastplate, or removing his helmet, or undoing the buckler from his 
shoulders, or laying aside his sword, he actually pitched camp and warned them that 
he would attack their walls and completely ravage the town. Nevertheless, he was 
anxious to spare Basilakios and to ensure this made proposals for peace through his 
companion, the monk Ioannikos (who had a good reputation for integrity). He 
promised him that if Basilakios surrendered himself and the town, he would suffer no 
ill-treatment. Basilakios was having none of it. However, the inhabitants of 
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Thessaloniki were afraid that the town would be taken and something terrible would 
happen, and so they allowed Komnenos to enter. 
But Basilakios, seeing what they were doing, went off to the citadel—from the frying 
pan into the fire. Although the domestikos gave his word that he would suffer no 
irremediable ill, Basilakios still refused to forget fighting and war; despite the 
dangers, hard-pressed though he was, he showed himself to be a true hero. 
Unflinching, always courageous, he would not yield an inch until the inhabitants of 
the citadel and the guards drove him out by force and handed him over to the megas 
domestikos.
4
 
While Anna is primarily concerned with the virtues and deeds of her aristocratic protagonists, 
her narrative also describes a community forced to make a weighty political decision with 
their collective survival potentially at stake. This decision is explicitly tied to the city’s walls 
and the townsfolk’s decision of what passages to allow or deny through those barriers. 
 However unsought the choices they face were, and however inferior their position, 
Anna does present the citizens of Thessaloniki as possessing political agency tied to their use 
of their walls, a power entirely out of step with the idea of unquestioned imperial authority 
over all the uses of walls. 
 On the other side of the equation, Emperor Andronikos I could probably be forgiven 
for doubting the validity of his untrammeled monopoly over fortifications when, according to 
the early thirteenth century historian Nicetas Choniates, he received the following reception 
from the walls of Nicaea, one of the largest cities of the empire and then risen in revolt 
against his reign. 
The defenders were insolent, not only when Andronikos was absent, but when he was 
present; appearing on the wall; they defended themselves with weapons and delivered 
blows of vulgarities, sparing neither missile nor obscenity. The gates of the city were 
shut and securely bolted, but the gates of the lips opened wide, and the defenders’ 
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 Anna Komnene, E. R. A. Sewter and Peter Frankopan, The Alexiad, (London; New York: Penguin, 2009), 28-
9. 
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tongues issued forth from the breastworks of the teeth to discharge missiles of 
scurrilities against Andronikos.
5
 
 These accounts and many others in the same vein severely complicate a simplistic 
image of the imperial state as the undisputed master of Byzantine fortifications and the 
civilian population as their passive beneficiary or victim. While the imperial state certainly 
succeeded in maintaining its authority over the cities and territories of its vast domain 
through its armies, bureaucracy and the centrifugal nexus of the imperial court, the 
relationship between the security and the loyalty of a given city to a given emperor was a 
complex business. 
Even when it is backed up with hard contemporary evidence, the concept that walls 
are inherently tools of the state used to control individuals and communities falls 
conveniently in line with very modern assumptions of what a wall is. To the twentieth or 
twenty-first century eye, a wall is inescapably an ugly thing. Walls sever space and limit 
horizons, imprisoning people and cutting communities apart. They are built by the powers-
that-be to impose authority upon ordinary people, to isolate minority groups and to fortify the 
gated space of the privileged against the common man. In our cultural vocabulary, “breaking 
down a barrier” is an inherently good thing to do. At their best, walls are unfortunate 
necessities that compromise freedom in the name of security and at their worst, they are 
physical symbols of how a society can dehumanize its members and of the ruthless small-
mindedness of “civilized” people. 
In his New York Times op-ed, “The Walls that Hurt Us,” Marcello Di Cintio provides 
an example of such a perspective. 
                                                 
5
 Choniates, Nicetas, O City of Byzantium: Annals of Niketas Choniates, trans. Harry J. Magoulias, (Detroit: 
Wayne State University Press, 1984), 156. 
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Through technology, barriers to trade, travel and communication keep falling, and yet 
our world has never been more physically divided by the geometries of bricks, barbed 
wire and steel. 
The political and economic ramifications of the walls are oft-discussed and well 
understood. So, too, is the psychological trauma suffered by those living in the 
shadow of the walls. In 1973, an East German psychiatrist even coined a term for the 
disorder: Mauerkrankheit, or Wall Disease.
6
 
As an indictment of modern border walls, Di Cintio’s article is penetrating and well 
supported. However, the article’s careless use of the term “wall” identifies walls in general 
with the very specific types of walls present in the modern world. As Di Cintio is writing in a 
modern context, examining the dehumanizing use of barbed wire, this slip is perfectly 
understandable. However, if historians of earlier periods make a similar mistake and are 
unable to detach walls-in-general from their own contemporary context, they can fall into 
dangerous anachronisms. Prison walls, concentration camp walls, border fences and the 
Berlin Wall, all these modern walls were indeed designed to sever communities, imprison 
individuals and control the passage of people. But that these are the only purposes walls were 
ever turned to, and that these are inherent capacities of any wall is simply an inaccurate 
statement, as we will see later on. 
 With this in mind, many historians view Byzantine walls in the context of a great 
historical tragedy: the decline of the Roman polis. Whether walls are seen as culprits or 
symptoms of the process, the fortification of cities was certainly an integral part of cities’ 
transition from population centers to fortified refuges. 
 Historians have generally concluded that Byzantine cities lost the political autonomy 
of their Roman ancestors. Indeed, while Roman cities were self-governing, commercially 
                                                 
6
 Marcello di Cintia, “The Walls that Hurt Us,” New York Times, January 23, 2014. 
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vibrant population centers, it is demonstrable that the crises of Late Antiquity reduced many 
Byzantine cities to mere fortified refuges. As John Haldon writes in “The Idea of the Town in 
the Byzantine Empire,” the Roman polis was defined by “ideological, juridical and 
institutional attributes.”
7
 Specifically, Roman cities had “a body of councilors drawn from a 
local landowning elite, a set of rights enshrined in the term dikaion poleos, publicly-funded 
buildings and services supported by locally-raised taxes and subscriptions or donatives, 
including water-supply and baths, theaters, market-places and temples, for example; not to 
mention autonomy of administration, and so on.”
8
 
 Over the course of Late Antiquity and the Byzantine period, however, this urban 
organism was battered and ultimately ruined by the pressures of taxation, political instability 
and above all endemic warfare. Many new cities not only acquired walls, but also shrank as 
the desperate government sought to defend a smaller perimeter or occupy only the most 
defensible ground. Many cities were reduced to tiny hilltop fortresses, retaining space only 
for military and ecclesiastical administration. 
Even when walls didn’t constrict urban space, they drained away wealth that had once 
been spent to maintain classical urban infrastructure. Wolfgang Liebeschuetz argued in “The 
End of the Ancient City” that the great expense and reduction of the urban perimeter 
necessitated by wall construction choked the life out of the classical cities, leaving them 
bankrupt, poorly populated and consequently heavily dependent upon the government.
9
 For 
Liebeschuetz, walls were a “mark of the changed and more utilitarian role of cities in Late 
                                                 
7
 John Haldon, “The Idea of the Town in the Byzantine Empire,” in The Idea and Ideal of the Town between 
Late Antiquity and the Early Middle Ages, ed. G.P. Brogiolo and Bryan Ward-Perkins (Leiden: Brill, 1999), 3. 
8
 Haldon, “Idea of the Town,” 3. 
9
 Wolfgang Liebeschuetz, “The End of the Ancient City” in The City in Late Antiquity, ed. John Rich (London 
and New York: Routledge 1992) 
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Antiquity.”
10
 The great classical public buildings that had expressed a high ideal of 
civilization and political development had been replaced by a fundamentally functional 
structure. 
 While Byzantines might continue to use the word polis to evoke this past, or to refer 
to surviving elements of it, a new word gradually began to appear in reference to the city’s 
role as a fortress: kastron. For Haldon, “The term kastron, in contrast, represented day-to-day 
values and realities. Its use says something of what people associated with it: a fortified 
refuge, a place of security.”
11
 Indeed, even those cities that retained a substantial population 
and commercial importance, such as Thessaloniki and Nicaea were often defined as kastrons 
because security had become the central attribute of a settlement. Only Constantinople might 
deserve consideration as a true polis. 
 While historians might debate exactly how this process occurred, its regional 
distribution or its rate, placing the moment of transition in one century rather than another, 
few would deny the basic distinction between politically active polis and politically passive 
kastron. If any Byzantine city retains political vitality, it is understood to stem from its 
retention of public buildings, local self-government by landlords and civic identification, not 
from its walls. Security is understood to be a task in which the city engages only as a passive 
recipient, not as an active participant. 
 However, this argument relies on a narrow definition of political power, understood 
only in terms of formal self-government administered in judicial, financial and cultural 
matters by the local aristocracy. Walls provided a very different kind of power: the power to 
regulate and control movement. Recently, a number of cultural historians have made the bold 
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 Liebeschuetz, “The End of the Ancient City,” 7. 
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and necessary step of considering walls as membranes that separate spaces and regulate 
passage between them. While these scholars are rarely Byzantinists, many of their studies are 
highly relevant to Byzantine history. For example, Hendrick Dey’s “The Aurelian Wall and 
the Refashioning of Imperial Rome” examined the late-antique walls of Rome not only as a 
fortifications, but as a source of legal divisions, economic regulation and divisions of sacred 
and non-sacred space.
12
 In “Knowledge, Constraint and Power in Inaction: The Defenseless 
Medieval Wall,” the contemporary medieval historian Ross Samson goes as far as to say that 
by separating spaces, fortifications convey power to those who control them. 
Walls separate space into the inside and outside, each rife with symbolic meaning, 
defining areas of authority or symbolizing possession. Walls constrain movement, 
and through the physical obstacle created, walls remove ambiguity from passage; they 
impart knowledge of “illegal” entry or exit. Such knowledge is power, but more 
power is conferred by the ability to control movement, whether of political foes or 
merchants wishing to trade.
13
 
However, far from disputing the established argument that walls harmed urban autonomy, 
cultural historians actually take it a step further arguing that the power of walls to regulate 
passage was one wielded only by rulers and elites, and that walls were instruments of state 
domination used to regulate, monitor and control urban people.  
 For example, for Ross Samson, the ability of walls to regulate and control the passage 
of movement exclusively benefits rulers and elite at the expense of the common masses: 
“rulers, lords and masters” gained power at the expense of slaves, peasants and civilians.
14
 
                                                 
12
 Hendrik W. Dey, The Aurelian Wall and the Refashioning of Imperial Rome, A.D. 271-855, (Cambridge, UK; 
New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011) 
13
 Ross Samson, “Knowledge, Constraint and Power in Inaction: The Defenseless Medieval Wall,” Historical 
Archaeology, Vol. 26, No. 3, (1992) 26-44, 26. 
14
 Samson, “The Defenseless Medieval Wall,” 34. 
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These elites occasionally turn their walls upon each other or lose control of their walls, but in 
general, elites use barriers to control the body of the people. 
Indeed, for Samson, common civilians gain power only through breaking and 
violating walls. Samson backs this up with examples from throughout European history, 
discussing how peasant revolts in France begin with “the almost symbolic destruction of 
manorial gatehouses.”
15
 Nuns rebel against an abbess by escaping over the convent wall or 
tossing the abbess off that wall.
16
 The handful of “extreme” cases in which walls were 
subverted only confirms the general rule: namely, that “most of the time barriers were 
erected and used in the manner originally foreseen with the appropriate forms of powers and 
sources of authority.
17
 
 Samson’s diagnosis might be correct when applied to the cases he chooses to 
examine, but if we examine Byzantine history, we suddenly find a great number of examples 
in which it was Byzantine communities who controlled their city walls, regulated the 
movement of armies and even dictated the passage of rulers. Byzantine sources are rife with 
examples of Byzantine towns using this power for their own purposes independently of 
imperial authority. 
 That is, Byzantine evidence shows that defending a kastron was actually a politically 
charged task in which complex, grave choices had to be made by whoever manned the walls. 
In the Byzantine world, as the city became increasingly integrated into the military 
environment, local inhabitants became participants in military affairs as defenders of their 
walls. Whether as civilians, militias, local thematic units or simply garrisons that had become 
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 Samson, “The Defenseless Medieval Wall,” 37. 
16
 Samson, “The Defenseless Medieval Wall,” 37. 
17
 Samson, “The Defenseless Medieval Wall,” 32. 
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a little too cozy with their hosts, local populations very much possessed a will of their own 
independent of the imperial state. While the state indeed impressed its will on the fortified 
settlements through the provision of garrisons, generals and governors, local populations 
were invariably important participants in military affairs. Especially as time went by, the 
Byzantine state simply did not possess the financial, manpower or administrative resources to 
maintain an imperial garrison in every city of the empire, and to shift those garrisons often 
enough to prevent their intermingling with the local population. Indeed, the state often relied 
upon locals to defend their own walls partially or entirely on their own, holding their 
fortresses against invaders at least until the central military could relieve them.  
 Imperial propaganda did not acknowledge this self-reliance and conserved the Roman 
ideal of an emperor who entirely insulates his people from warfare without their 
participation. The imperial narrative presented walls as protective gifts that were one way the 
emperor fulfilled this responsibility. Nevertheless, while the emperor indeed built and 
sometimes even paid for fortifications, walls required human bravery and judgment to be 
effective, and while the emperor attempted to provide this factor with garrisons and 
commanders, in many cases, local populations had to supply this deficit themselves. War 
forced cities to make choices at and with walls, despite the emperor’s firm assurance he 
would bear the entire burden of military and political decision-making himself. 
 While imperial ideology indeed demanded the emperor receive absolute loyalty in 
exchange for the provision of absolute security, the involvement of local populations in 
warfare as defenders of their fortifications made imperial oversight of urban security partial 
and limited. Whoever controlled the walls of a city held the power to surrender to a foreign 
attacker: to abandon the attempt to repel hostile ingress in favor of a negotiated entrance 
upon specific terms that might preserve local lives and livelihoods. Where urban 
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communities possessed such agency, the provision of security promised by the state became 
to some degree contractual—a community’s loyalty conditional upon imperial capacity to 
bolster urban defenses and ultimately relieve a settlement with the full might of the 
government. 
 This relationship held a great deal of tension because the state was often unreliable 
and distracted. In many cases, the prospect of relief was little more than a hope, and cities 
truly had to defend themselves with their own resources. 
 In fact, the state was not only occasionally unreliable, but also often divided against 
itself in brutal civil wars for the throne. Under such circumstances, the contractual 
relationship between emperor and urban defenders acquired an additional layer of ambiguity. 
Indeed, when both the besieger and potential reliever claimed to hold sovereign autocratic 
authority, cities were placed in a deadly zero-sum game in which their choices could mean 
radically different things depending on which contender was ultimately victorious. 
 In the mercurial, treacherous game of Byzantine politics, when the imperial state was 
neglectful, hostile or divided against itself, communities used their walls as they saw fit to 
protect their own vital interests. Whether faced with foreign invasion, civil war, tyrannical 
ambition or some unholy combination of all three, Byzantine towns lived or died by the 
choices they made with their walls. However inferior a position towns were confined to by 
the power of the imperial state’s ideological and administrative resources, walls gave them a 
lone bargaining chip, a stage upon which they could negotiate with, subvert or even defy the 
power of emperors. 
 During civil warfare, it was emperors and rulers who sought passage into cities and 
cities who chose whether to allow or deny them passage and what reception to give them.  
When Ross Samson writes that walls made passage “unambiguous,” criminalizing “illegal,” 
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unregulated entry, he has in mind landowners shaming poachers or guilds regulating 
commerce. But when an emperor demanded recognition of his legitimacy at the city gates, it 
was the people on the walls who held the power to recognize him or not. In ceremonial and 
military engagements alike, at walls, emperors and state representatives played the role of the 
passer-through and the town community the role of the passage-regulator. However mighty 
the emperor, the community had the power to choose the reception to give him. 
 The willingness of cities to discard their power to restrict the imperial authority was 
directly proportionate to an emperor’s ability to live up to his own stated ideal of protective 
guardianship. When an emperor demonstrated his power and ability to defend his citizens, 
cities acquiesced and celebrated imperial power over walls. But when an emperor failed to 
demonstrate his capacity to defend the city, or worse, actually threatened urban security, 
cities used their walls to defy and subvert his authority, bestowing their loyalty on a more 
palatable competitor. The emperor could indeed simply overcome this power by overcoming 
the wall, but in doing so he risked transforming himself into a wall-violating threat to society 
and impoverishing his ideological legitimacy. In practice, engagements at city walls were not 
clear-cut, rather, they were ambiguous performances in which force, rhetoric and legitimacy 
were promiscuously intermingled. 
I find civilian participation at city walls in the Byzantine Empire fascinating precisely 
because it occurred in direct violation of the imperial state’s loudly proclaimed and 
feverishly enforced monopoly upon military-political activity. Regardless of what emperors 
built walls to accomplish, towns were perfectly capable of using walls for their own purposes 
when the situation became desperate. 
 My general goal is to assert the presence of Byzantine communities upon the 
historical stage as military-political agents, and to locate the site of their activity in the spatial 
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context of the interactions, engagements and conflicts that took place before Byzantine city 
walls. While these interactions and the local agency they reflected are staples of Byzantine 
literary evidence, historians have largely neglected them. I believe my focus upon the narrow 
ground of the specific interactions excuses the broad chronological and topographical scope 
of this thesis. I believe that this specific set of evidence demonstrates that in the civil 
conflicts that fractured the empire, a wall was an asset to rather than a burden upon a 
Byzantine city, an instrument citizens wielded to protect their own interests. 
 My story is not a happy one: I do not aim to prove that Byzantine communities were 
serenely secure, or to fish for some lost period of virtuous democratic communal identity. 
Byzantine citizens lived in a dangerous world that often threw them upon their own 
resources. The imperial state was seen as awesomely powerful but not necessarily reliable: 
Byzantine citizens hoped that mighty soldier-emperors would smite the barbarians and keep 
their lands and homes safe, but they suffered under an often burdensome imperial yoke and 
often felt the worst ravages of foreign invasion ill-prevented by the state. During periods of 
civil war, communities watched the great imperial edifice turn viciously against itself and 
picked sides as best they could. I am often dealing with desperate, frightened people making 
hard choices with everything at stake. But it is important to remember that they did make 
choices, and that walls were the platforms that allowed them to do so. While the wealth and 
freedoms of the classical polis may have vanished under the pressures of war and monarchy, 
living, breathing people continued to inhabit the fallen world of the Byzantine Empire, 
exercising an anxious freedom upon the battlements of their kastrons.
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2. Outline 
 
Statement of Thesis 
 My thesis makes the claim that Byzantine city walls were instruments of collective 
urban political decisions that provided Byzantine communities a stage upon which to 
negotiate their relationship with the imperial state. 
 
Chapter Summaries 
 My first chapter will lay out the role of city walls as envisioned by imperial 
propaganda and critically analyze in what ways the imperial state attempted to realize this 
vision. Emperors claimed absolute power over imperial security, asserting that they held the 
power to realize this vision. They presented walls as part of this responsibility: as barriers 
insulating communities from warfare. 
 My second chapter will qualify and challenge this picture by demonstrating that in 
practice, while walls were effective barriers, they had to be manned and managed. Byzantine 
military strategy relied upon most communities to defend themselves behind their walls with 
minimal state assistance in the form of support, evacuation and direction while the state 
attempted to compel the departure of the enemy. The urban community was brought into 
contact with the battlefield not as a passive victim but as a participant. 
 My third chapter will assert that communal participation and even management of 
urban defense granted communities substantial military agency, transforming the relationship 
between subject and state from an exchange of total loyalty for total security into a 
contractual arrangement dependent upon both the decision to hold out on the part of towns 
and the decision to relieve on the part of the emperor. Thus, while emperors remained in 
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overall control of imperial defense, their relationship with towns depended upon trust, loyalty 
and communication, rather than simple passive obedience. 
 My fourth chapter will severely complicate the relationship between towns and 
emperors by examining how this relationship was affected by the politics of civil war and 
usurpation. While during a foreign invasion, a city had to weigh the risks of surrendering to 
the besiegers against the ability and willingness of the emperor to relieve them if they 
resisted siege, during civil wars, in which an emperors besieged and relieved cities alike, 
legitimacy was thrown up in the air, to be reclaimed by whoever could best act the part. 
While urban defense against invaders was politically charged, during civil war the character 
of every engagement at a wall became incredibly ambiguous, determined by the interaction 
between the performance of the imperial claimant and the reception given him by the 
inhabitants manning the walls.  
 
Conclusion 
In these interactions, Byzantine cities did not seek to use their power over walls to 
deny the imperial narrative of the benevolent wall-protecting king or repudiate imperial 
authority, but rather that they sought to renew their ordinary contractual relationship with an 
imperial protector, and used their power when an emperor proved himself incapable of living 
up to his ideal of guardianship and relinquished their power when he proved that he could. 
Thus, engagements between cities and the representatives of the state at city walls were not 
about resistance to an imperial narrative or the assertion of a contradictory narrative of urban 
freedom, but rather, were tests of an emperor’s ability to perform, persuade and prove to the 
audience on the battlements his fidelity to imperial ideals. 
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While force was one element of this process, it was often difficult for an emperor to 
assert his ideal by force, because to violate a city wall contradicted any claim of the besieger 
to be a wall-defender and indeed painted the violator a heathen, tyrannical enemy of society. 
An emperor could indeed seize actual power through siege warfare, but he risked the loss of 
the ideological power that was so fundamental to the game of Byzantine monarchical 
legitimacy. All of these elements were in play before Byzantine walls, and my goal is to 
demonstrate that the politics of the gate constituted a special theater for the exercise of 
Byzantine statecraft by rulers and/or subjects, just as did the palace, the hippodrome, the 
military camp or the church. 
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3. Literature Review and Methodology 
 
My thesis will demonstrate that city walls were a crucial arena for internal political 
conflict in the empire, and indeed that the partitioning of society into a series of defensible 
walled nuclei informed the basic structure of Byzantine politics. 
I did not set out looking to write a paper about walls as political tools of urban 
interests. I was originally far more interested in the religious aspects of walls, and later the 
relationship between walls and emperors. However, as I trawled through primary sources for 
references to walls, certain patterns became difficult to ignore. References to people, 
sometimes “soldiers” and “garrisons” but quite frequently “civilians,” “inhabitants,” 
“citizens” and “townsfolk” making choices with walls were intriguing. While many of these 
choices would seem to be so basic that they require little explanation (i.e. if a city runs out of 
food it will have to surrender), I was increasingly struck by the immense complexity of these 
interactions and of the diverse elements at play.  
Moreover, when I turned to scholarly works on Byzantine cities or fortifications, I 
was surprised by the lack of discussion of such interactions. Indeed, a good number of works 
directly covering the relationship between warfare, cities and fortifications, while they might 
reference the consequences of some siege upon the city, failed to analyze the course of such 
interactions in any detail. Such analysis might be found in a discussion of the social and 
economic functions of walls (market days, the exile of heretics) but rarely for military or 
political actions. My thesis aims to rectify this gap by corralling the rich body of these events 
together and analyzing the basic dynamics and concerns at play. 
 My argument is based above all upon primary sources. Analysis of narrative sources 
such as chronicles and histories reveal that political activity often took place at city walls. 
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Specifically, such sources relate a number of standoffs not only between invader and 
defenders but internal parties. 
 My primary sources include a number of chronicles and histories from across 
Byzantine history such as Michael Psellus’s Chronographia, Theophylact Simoccatta’s 
History, John of Nikiu’s Chronicle, Anna Komnene’s Alexiad and Nicetas Choniates’s 
Annals. I have also examined a number of Byzantine military manuals relevant to siegecraft 
and city defense, including a sixth century treatise on strategy, a ninth century treatise on 
skirmishing, the famous sixth century Strategikon of Emperor Maurice and an anonymous 
tenth century manual on urban defense. I have also examined several works of the prolific 
scholar-emperor Constantine Porphyrogenitus, particularly his On Imperial Administration. 
 A criticism that might be leveled against my use of these sources is that they are 
geographically and chronologically disparate: I make use of sources from every corner of the 
empire and from the earliest to the latest periods. This is defensible because my purpose is 
not so much to examine whether a given siege or triumph actually occurred, but to reveal and 
examine the relatively stable cultural judgment of the wall as a particular species of political 
arena in which a specific set of interactions occurred. Sources demonstrate that Byzantine 
authors had a standard view of how the theater of the gate worked, who the players were and 
what was at stake. While elements certainly evolved over time (a development I have tried to 
capture) certain elements recur often in these written sources throughout the centuries: 
1. Repeated descriptions of standoffs involving two Byzantine parties at city walls. I 
have accounts of rival claimants jockeying for power, small towns rejecting imperial 
officials, breakaway cities rejecting imperial authority, emperors offering to relieve 
non-imperial cities in exchange for submission, towns battling each other and 
garrisons resisting commanders all taking place at city walls. At the very least, such 
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sources prove that internal conflict frequently took place at city walls. 
2. The decisive agency of the local population in many interactions taking place at 
walls. Narrative sources and military manuals alike, while occasionally formally 
arguing in favor of military control of walls, provide numerous examples in which the 
interests and actions of the civilian population were the determinant of whether a 
siege would continue, a claimant would be allowed entrance, etc. 
3. The fluidity between military and non-military activity at the walls. For example, 
historians have traditionally placed triumphal entrances and sieges into different 
categories of historical discipline: political/ideological and military history, 
respectively. In these sources, however, the two events are often not so far apart. 
Sources provide the example of both an emperor who besieged Constantinople but 
rejected the chance to break inside by force in the hope of a legitimate, semi-
triumphal entrance and of an emperor who chose to chance a forceful entrance and 
suffered a degree of public disgrace as a consequence. Sources show that the forceful 
rejection and the honorable acceptance of a ruler’s request for ingress were two sides 
of the same coin, a choice that a walltop commander could make, not two totally 
distinct phenomena. Triumphal ceremonies featured many elements of actual military 
surrenders including a ritual declaration of submission by representatives of the city 
to the ruler. 
4. The performative aspect of all interactions taking place at walls. On the crudest level, 
sources describe confrontations at walls as invitations for jeering and mockery 
between sides. Sieges often took the form of testosterone-fueled tests of will 
centering upon risky gestures of contempt or bravery. On a more refined level, 
sources describe confrontations at walls as stages for rhetoric and argument in the 
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best classical traditions: we have records of a wide variety of speeches including 
detailed requests for surrender, elaborate paeans of welcome and at least one 
principled speech by a messenger, who although offered bribes and threatened with 
death by the besiegers nevertheless informs a besieged city that imperial relief is on 
the way, an act which is depicted as a true display of ancient civic virtue. While it 
might be debated whether these specific events took place or speeches were made, 
this evidence reveals that Byzantines saw walls as places for both verbal and physical 
confrontation or welcome. 
 
I believe that I can trust many of my sources because my questions strike very close 
to the basic interests of Byzantine authors. Most chronicles and histories are enormously 
interested in how one achieves success in interactions at walls, or at the very least in loudly 
proclaiming how their favored protagonists achieved their victories in them. This deep 
concern with the fundamental dynamic of the politics of the gate makes Byzantine 
descriptions likely to be relatively reliable sources, at the very least for the formation of a 
basic understanding of what the players and the goals were as a rule. Above all, what is most 
convincing about these examples is their consistency. The theater of the gate is almost a 
literary trope in Byzantine literature. When nothing unexpected occurs in such an interaction 
a narrative will simply state that city X opened or closed its gates to army/ruler Y as 
shorthand for describing the whole interaction. Often, the only time we receive detailed 
descriptions of interactions at the wall is when something extraordinary happens: some act of 
divine intervention, exceptionally heroic deed or particularly reprehensible example of foul 
play. 
The other main reason why it is acceptable to use such a wide range of sources is that 
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siege warfare did not change a great deal in the Byzantine Empire, and a static literature 
might reasonably be expected for a static art. Archaeology shows some interesting 
developments in siege defense and we know of certain famous innovations in offense, such 
as Greek fire, but for the most part the preponderant bulk of archaeological evidence shows 
that siege warfare changed little. Walls were effective barriers that while they could be 
overcome, certainly gave a great advantage to defenders and put even relatively inferior 
defenders on at least a level playing field with a strong force of besiegers. Starvation and 
trickery were the preferred ways to achieve surrender and although siege warfare proper 
appears in major campaigns it was an expensive, dangerous and time-consuming business. 
This basic dynamic changed very little from the reign of Constantine until Ottoman cannons 
breached the walls of Constantinople. 
 While I have already outlined the basic progression of historiography relevant to my 
topic in my introduction, several specific works informed and influenced the direction of my 
research, arguments and conclusions. 
 Although it does not cover Byzantine history, Paul Bentley Kern’s “Ancient Siege 
Warfare” offers an extremely productive methodology for how a historian might study the 
relationship between warfare, walls, communities and rulers. Kern examines Middle Eastern 
and Mediterranean siege warfare in a chronological fashion, concentrating on well-
documented or developmentally important periods. What makes Kern’s text unique is his 
pairing of the technical, military-historical analysis of siege warfare with the social, cultural 
and even psychological effects of it. For example, the first section of Kern’s chapter on early 
Greek siege warfare examines the composition of polis walls, the relative incapacity of Greek 
citizen-soldiers to surmount them and provides a chronological narrative of siege warfare in 
the Persian Wars. His second section, however, examines the treatment of captured cities in 
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social and economic terms, the cultural constructs of domesticity and gender enforced by the 
wall and examines literature such as the Illiad or the play The Trojan Women to document 
contemporary views on these subjects. Overall, Kern’s synthesis of military and cultural 
history analyzes in depth the connections between different aspects of walls, forming a 
coherent total picture.  
Hendrick Dey’s “The Aurelian and the Refashioning of Imperial Rome, AD 271-
855,” is a perfect example of how postmodern cultural historians are enriching the study of 
fortifications. Dey focuses upon a single fortification in particular: the Aurelian Wall of 
Rome, concluding that it has been neglected as a cultural, religious, economic, social and 
political as well as military structure. While the specific focus of my own analysis, the 
military-political interactions between rulers and communities at city walls, is not one of 
Dey’s primary issues, his book does provide a much-needed perspective on how city walls 
can affect and direct human affairs. In a similar vein, “The Practice, Perception and 
Experience of Byzantine Fortifications,” by Nikolas Bakirtzis provides a synthetic analysis of 
all aspects of a single fortification, the walls of Byzantine Thessaloniki. While I only 
discovered Bakirtzis’s article recently, it provides another example of how cultural-minded 
synthetic history of all aspects of a single wall can be intensely productive. 
Leonora Neville’s Authority in Byzantine Provincial Society, 950-1100 provided me 
with a crucial piece of my puzzle by exploring how the political activity of communities 
operated under the imperial radar, and how communities avoided strict power structures in 
favor of broad, anonymous collective consensuses. Neville also excellently summarizes the 
totalizing, zero-sum nature of imperial authority. However, Neville (surprisingly for me), 
fails to explore the way these dynamics would relate to the experience of siege warfare. For 
me, seeing how her ideas of communal power relations applied to the evidence on urban 
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defense was a natural next step. 
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4. Chapter I: The Imperial Assertion upon the Wall: The Emperor as Creator and 
Guardian of Walled Space 
 
 Imperial ideals of fortification patronage and military activity cast the emperor and 
his government in the role of a benevolent protector of cities, the custodian of sacred urban 
space. Byzantine emperors argued that walls were inherently imperial structures and walling 
a monarchical responsibility, part of the emperor’s general role as ultimate protector of 
society. 
 The emperor presented a very particular vision of this relationship: society is 
comprehended as a walled city surrounded on all sides by hostile, monstrous, barbarian 
forces. The emperor is understood to be the one true protector. Walls are his creations and 
under his authority. The imperial relationship to the protective power of walls was publically 
displayed and enhanced by triumphal imperial entrances. 
 Patronage of city walls (as well as other fortifications) was a fundamental element of 
the Byzantine ideal of rulership.
18
 Byzantine literature placed responsibility for protecting 
civilization in the hands of one individual human being: the holy emperor of the Romans. 
Monarchist political theorists held that all authority had been delegated to the emperor by 
God, and that the legitimacy of all states, officials and armies emanated down from the 
imperial person and were thus subordinate to him as he was in turn subordinate to Christ. As 
the deacon Agapetus reminded Justinian, the latter had “been entrusted by God with the 
empire of the world.
19
 The basic nature of this authority was the emperor’s responsibility to 
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maintain, uphold and protect Christian Roman civilization against enemies internal and 
external: from the internal with laws and from the external with armies and fortifications. 
The scholar-emperor Constantine Porphyrogenitus encapsulates the awesome scope of the 
emperor’s responsibility in his account of the ritual prayer for urban protection the emperor 
made when leaving the capital city of Constantinople. 
When the emperor is a sufficient distance from the imperial harbor, so that he can 
look upon the City, he rises from his couch and stands looking eastwards with his 
hands raised to heaven; and making the sign of the Cross three times with his hand 
over the City, he prays to God and says: “Lord Jesus Christ, my God, I place in Your 
hands this Your city. Defend it from all enemies and misfortunes which approach it, 
from civil strife, and from the inroads of the heathen. Guard it impregnable and 
unassailable, for we place our hopes in You. You are the Lord of forgiveness and 
Father of compassion and God of every supplication, and Yours is the power of 
mercy and salvation and deliverance from temptation and dangers, now and always 
and forever more. Amen.
20
 
In the absence of the emperor, only Christ could serve as a suitable custodian. With the aid of 
priests or churchmen, the emperor was believed to hold the power to place a city under 
divine protection. 
 More specifically, the divine nature of the emperor’s authority made the protection he 
promised correspondingly unassailable. As the above prayer shows, walls were only the most 
mundane element: as many Byzantine clerics held, only spiritual fortifications could be truly 
impregnable, and these the emperor promises. As the deacon Agapetus assured Justinian, “A 
citadel secured by unbreachable walls looks down on the enemies who besiege it. Your pious 
empire, walled by acts of charity with prayers for towers, becomes impregnable to the 
missiles of your foes.”
21
 As will be demonstrated, the emperor conveniently left the 
distinction between spiritual and material protection vague: the overall point was that the 
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security was to be airtight, cocooning the cities of the empire from violence. Patronage of 
walls was one element of this responsibility. 
 In much of Byzantine literature, the Byzantine emperor emerges as a miracle-working 
saintly figure, although also possessing the martial traits of a warrior-hero. Byzantine 
apocalyptic narratives, a relatively popular genre, replace the narrative of overthrown 
imperial tyranny offered by the Biblical Book of Revelations with an epic of imperial 
heroism against savage barbarian hordes. In the Apocalypse of Pseudo-Methodius, in the last 
days barbarians would break free and ravage the settled lands, devastating farmland and 
tearing down walls, finally forcing their way into Constantinople itself.
22
 However, at this 
point, the emperor, formerly mired in decadence and ill-council, would suddenly “bestir 
himself as one rising suddenly awake from a drunken stupor,” take up his sword and smite 
the barbarians, driving them out of the city and obliterating them utterly.
23
 
 While apocalyptic stories paint perhaps an overly hysterical, exultant portrait of 
imperial power, it is important to keep the deep-seated mass appeal the emperor held as a 
superhero that might ride to the rescue even in the darkest hours. 
 This political and religious ideal of the emperor as a mighty guardian of cities 
fundamentally informed and was in turn reinforced by imperial patronage of fortifications. 
All fortifications were understood to be proof of imperial benevolence and physical 
embodiments of the imperial state’s commitment to defend its communities. 
 Political theorists and imperial propagandists offered that the provision of 
fortifications was an integral part of the responsibility laid upon the emperor to defend his 
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subjects. In his The Buildings, the historian Procopius praises the various defensive works of 
the Emperor Justinian I by comparing them to the famous pyramids of Egypt. While the 
pharaohs “expended labor on a useless show,” Justinian, (evidently a far more responsible 
monarch) “preserved the Empire, walling it about and frustrating the attacks of the barbarians 
on the Romans.”
24
 
 Of course, The Buildings, which aggrandizes Justinian by attributing to him a number 
of the fortifications built by his predecessor Anastasius and exaggerates their number and 
quality, was far more a work of imperial propaganda than a disinterested military engineering 
treatise. In Procopius’s narrative, Justinian is a giant, a sympathetic and attentive guardian 
who examines the particular defensive needs of each settlement in his empire and devises 
novel engineering solutions, all while keeping in mind the value of a given site to the empire 
as a whole. 
 The basic power Justinian possess in this narrative is his ability to make space secure 
or even impregnable through his fortifications. As mentioned, the space he secures is both the 
space of the individual city or fortress, and the space of the empire as a whole. 
 Procopius describes how in regard to the fortresses in the mountains between the 
cities of Daras and Amida, “which had previously been fenced about in most ridiculous 
fashion, he rebuilt and made safe, transforming them to their present aspect as to both beauty 
and strength, and making them impregnable, so that actually they are thrown out as a mighty 
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bulwark to shield the land of the Romans.”
25
 He likewise “made the defenses of the city [of 
Constantine] impregnable to the enemy.
26
 
 Procopius places equal stress upon the divine aspect of Justinian’s effort adding to the 
scope and legitimacy of the emperor-as-builder. When the city of Circesium’s walls were in a 
dilapidated state and its riverward side was left completely open, “then appeared the Emperor 
Justinian, entrusted by God with this commission, to watch over the whole Roman Empire 
and, so far as was possible, to remake it.”
27
 Indeed, Procopius records that Justinian 
occasionally profited from direct divine intervention, such as when one of his builders, 
grappling with a difficult defensive problem, received a solution in a dream. Thus, according 
to Procopius, “God becomes a partner with this Emperor in all matters which will benefit the 
State.”
28
 
 While propaganda might exaggerate the scope and quality of a given ruler’s 
contribution, the construction and maintenance of fortifications was certainly a responsibility 
Byzantine emperors generally sought to fulfill. Historians have demonstrated that while local 
officials might be responsible for routine maintenance and even occasional repairs, direct 
imperial patronage lay behind the most impressive walls and most expansive regional 
schemes that remain for archaeologists to study. According to James Crow, the fortifications 
of Amorium and Dyrrachium, two key Byzantine cities, were the result of the careful 
patronage of emperors Zeno and Anastasius respectively.
29
 The Theodosian land walls of 
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Constantinople were the product of Theodosius II’s administration specifically (although the 
emperor himself was merely a boy at the time.)
30
 Emperors had no successful competitors in 
this arena, and no one attempted to build non-imperial types of fortresses such as private 
castles and on the whole, the “imperial administration should be credited with maintaining a 
monopoly upon fortification” and preserving the Justinianic ideal of the wall-building ruler.
31
 
 While the emperor was held responsible for the defense of the whole empire, he 
claimed a special relationship with the security of one city in particular: Constantinople. 
From the reign of Constantine, “Christian Constantinople … became a second Rome in the 
eyes of the Christians of the East.”
32
 Indeed, the city’s very founding embodied the fusion of 
Rome, Christianity and imperial monarchy: according to legend, Constantine sketched in the 
dirt the boundaries where the city walls would be built with his spear point, echoing the 
ceremonial tracing of the walls that had been performed to dedicate Roman cities since 
Romulus consecrated the future walls of Rome. However, according to legend, at least, 
Constantine did not sanctify the boundary to pagan deities, but rather was directed by angels 
or God.
33
 Regardless of Constantine’s true motives and the probable pagan elements to the 
dedication of this supposedly Christian city, in later times the immaculate founding of 
Constantinople by the first Christian Emperor was the great foundation legend of Byzantine 
culture, cementing the connection between God, ruler, walls and civic safety. 
 It is fitting that the story of Constantinople, the heart of the Christian Roman Empire 
begins at the walls. The inviolability of Constantinople, secured by the emperor’s contract 
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with God, Christ and the Virgin Mary as well as the city walls, was one of the most 
distinctive traits of Constantinople’s spiritual and social identity. 
 
 
Figure 3. Emperor Constantine’s donation of the city of Constantinople to the Virgin Mary (from the Hagia 
Sophia). Note the enormous visual prominence assigned to stylized city walls. 
http://3.bp.blogspot.com/-bzJfn  
   
 Byzantine emperors translated their ideological responsibility over walling into an 
administrative and legal monopoly over fortification patronage. The Justinian Codex 
preserved the idea of walls as religious structures falling entirely under the authority of the 
emperor, and shows how ideology was coded into law. According to the Digest, the 
collection of ancient Roman laws considered to retain legal validity, city walls and gates are 
“sanctified” and “sacred” structures, and since “a public place only becomes a sacred one 
when the emperor has dedicated it or granted the power of dedicating it” the religious quality 
of walls is placed firmly under imperial control.
34
 More explicitly, the Digest states, “It is 
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unlawful to rebuilt the walls of municipalities without authorization of the emperor or the 
governor.”
35
 
 The Byzantine ideal of imperial fortifications was founded upon ancient traditions of 
wall-building sacred kingship, and upon a distinction between positive walled space and 
negative unwalled space fundamental to walled city civilizations throughout history. 
 The relationship between emperors and walls was publically entrenched by triumphal 
ceremonies of imperial entrance. The reception of an important imperial dignitary at the city 
gate was a political ritual with a pedigree stretching back to the Roman Republic. In ancient 
Rome, citizens were forbidden to enter the city walls in their capacity as soldiers unless the 
city was actively besieged. The splendid exception to this sacred rule was the triumph: a 
grand ceremonial entrance by a general at the head of his troops granted by the senate only in 
the case of extraordinary military victories. When Julius Caesar and his descendants violated 
this barrier, they nevertheless retained the usefully spectacular ritual of the triumph. The 
triumph soon became more and more a propaganda tool of the reigning ruler, who 
increasingly reserved it for the wearers of the purple, rarely granting it to generals. The most 
politically charged element of the triumph, the declaration of welcome by the representatives 
of the Senate and the commoners at the city gate, degraded first from a ritual welcome to a 
ritual submission and by the Byzantine era was little more than a weightless formal 
rubberstamp. 
 In the Byzantine era, triumphs remained an important political ritual, and were 
traditionally celebrated whenever the emperor returned to Constantinople from a successful 
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campaign. Indeed, virtually every entrance by a reigning emperor was a ceremony, the pomp 
corresponding to the duration and success of his absence. 
The imperial state founded its monopoly over fortifications upon the promise that the 
emperor could provide absolutely undivided and absolutely effective security. The problem 
was, while omnipotent and unitary in theory, the imperial state was often ineffective and 
divided in fact. Imperial propaganda confronted the reality of military dangers to society by 
positing the emperor as a wall-building rescuer. However, while the emperor did oversee 
patronage of walls, he left cities to defend their walls themselves. 
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5. Chapter II: The Limits of Imperial Power and Civilian Defense of Walls 
 
 The great paradox of Byzantine city walls is that while they were undeniably the 
product of the state’s patronage, they were generally in practice manned by their own 
citizens. While imperial propaganda founded the state monopoly over fortifications upon the 
emperor’s sacred responsibility to insulate his people from warfare, the very idea that the 
emperor was maintaining a strict separation between soldierly and civilian space was a legal 
fiction, a relic of the day when Roman strategy restricted invaders to the distant frontiers. 
The increasing reliance upon defense-in-depth strategies, founded upon city walls rather than 
border defenses, brought cities violently into the military environment, and threw them upon 
their own devices during enemy invasions. During actual warfare, the survival of cities 
depended not only upon the state’s fortifications, but upon the local population that manned 
them. 
 In modern warfare, cities are extremely vulnerable to military violence. Tactically, 
the “urban environment” favors the defensive, as the Battle of Stalingrad demonstrated, and 
can be difficult to occupy, but no particular barrier prevents warfare from spilling into urban 
space. Moreover, no amount of preparation can prevent the total annihilation of even the 
largest city by modern airborne ballistics. In military terms, the modern city is a passive stage 
for warfare relatively undistinguished from the surrounding terrain. In the modern world, 
civilian population centers present no resistance to the movement of armies. Even the most 
impressive modern fortifications, such as the Israeli border walls, are designed to repel 
infiltration, immigration and guerilla activity and would be incapable of withstanding for a 
minute the pulverizing assault of the artillery, tanks and aircraft of a modern mechanized 
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army. In this context, modern societies are extremely reliant upon the protection provided by 
standing armies to provide security. 
 Similarly, in the ancient Roman world, the citizens of the empire’s vast hinterland 
relied entirely upon the imperial military to provide security at the borders. In the early 
empire, military resources were almost entirely concentrated upon the empire’s most 
defensible frontiers, such as the Rhine and Danube rivers.
36
 No penetration of imperial 
territory was to be allowed: enemies were to be repelled at the borders. Border fortresses and 
the odd frontier city were stoutly walled, but no effort was made to fortify provincial cities, 
and any walls they possessed were either relics of pre-imperial times or symbols of civic 
pride.
37
 However, over the course of the Roman Empire’s history, Roman defensive 
arrangements became less and less consistent with the state’s promise to insulate its citizens 
from warfare. Specifically, the exposure of fortified cities to warfare became more and more 
common over time as more and more enemy penetration of imperial territory was accepted. 
 In the Late Roman Empire, the somewhat increased exposure of cities to warfare 
resulted in the construction of fortifications and some involvement of civilians in military 
affairs. Over the course of the third and fourth centuries, in response both to the inflexibility 
of this arrangement and the politically vulnerable position it left central rulers, emperors, 
while maintaining substantial bodies of border troops (limitanae) on the frontiers, created 
new field armies to accompany the emperor and his immediate subordinates, allowing them 
to respond reactively to threats without withdrawing armies from some other portion of the 
border.
38
 In practice, this arrangement allowed or at least accepted that the enemy would 
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penetrate the frontier, invading at least the immediate frontier provinces. To this end, the 
imperial state took steps to fortify cities throughout the empire in the fourth and fifth 
centuries, although many in the central provinces were left unwalled.
39
 Fortified refuges were 
built for rural civilians to retreat to, although these were simple constructions better suited to 
defending against bandits than soldiers.
40
 Overall however, civilians assumed and the 
government assured that these walls were largely precautionary measures, and that the 
imperial field armies would quickly intercept and destroy any invaders even before they 
reached the city gates.
41
 
While urban exposure to warfare remained low in the third and fourth centuries, 
whenever and wherever it occurred the willingness of citizens to defend their walls became 
an important political issue. 
In the context of condemning the Emperor Jovian’s decision to surrender a string of 
fortified centers to the Persian king in 363, the fourth century historian Ammianus 
Marcellinus describes how the citizens of the city of Nisibis had long defended themselves 
against the Persians. Of course, in this early era of relatively “hard” defense, only a frontier 
city such as Nisibis would come into contact with enemies. Nevertheless, Ammianus asserts 
that where cities came into contact with warfare, citizens defended their walls. According to 
Ammianus, Nisibis was an “impregnable city” and “the strongest bulwark of the East.”
42
 He 
goes so far as to assert that, “It was generally held that the eastern world could have fallen 
into the hands of Persia but for the resistance of this well-placed and strongly fortified 
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town.”
43
 Ammianus establishes that while Nisibis may or may not have had a garrison, it was 
its own “inhabitants” who formed the city’s primary and if necessary sole defenders.
44
 When 
the citizens were ordered by the Roman Emperor to evacuate the city so that the Persians 
might occupy it, the “council and the people” entreat Emperor Jovian 
That they should not be compelled to go, declaring that they were strong enough to 
defend their homes by themselves without support from the state in provisions and 
men, and that they were sure that justice would come to their help in their fight for 
their birthplace, as so often in the past.
45
 
Ammianus goes on to emphasize the civilian status of Nisibis’s defenders with a moving 
description of their exodus from the city walls, detailing the laments of women and children. 
Of course, Ammianus has his own agenda, using the example of Nisibis to highlight the 
difference between Jovian and his predecessor, Ammianus’s hero, Julian. Ammianus 
emphasizes that Nisibis had never been surrendered by an emperor without a fight, but 
glosses over the fact that city had in fact exchanged hands several times over the centuries. 
But while the impregnability of the city and the martial virtue of its citizens certainly serve 
the historian’s general purpose, Ammianus is a reliable enough source for us to accept the 
basics of his narrative. For Ammianus, while the virtue of the citizens is certainly important, 
it is the great walls of the city that allow such civilians to defeat the large, disciplined armies 
of the Persians. 
 However, civilian unwillingness to man their walls could create on an imperial 
headache just as easily as civilian pugnacity. Fifth century sources record with frustration the 
unwillingness of Italian citizens to defend against barbarians in favor of the dying, 
                                                 
43
 Ammianus Marcellinus, The Later Roman Empire, 306. 
44
 Ammianus Marcellinus, The Later Roman Empire, 306. 
45
 Ammianus Marcellinus, The Later Roman Empire, 308. 
 
39 
burdensome and unreliable Western Roman Empire, even possessing strong fortifications. 
While they might have been provided with strong walls just like the veteran citizens of 
Nisibis, the civilians of the Italian heartland were unprepared for and highly demoralized by 
the appearance of barbarian invaders, and for the most part unwilling to protect themselves 
without substantial encouragement and support by the state.
46
 
 In the Byzantine Empire, over the course of its history, cities were fully integrated 
into the military environment as fortified strong points and civilian refuge centers, resulting 
in intense civilian participation in warfare. While the Late Roman military system proved 
incapable of preventing the collapse of the western empire, the surviving Eastern or 
Byzantine Empire retained the distinction between limitanae and field armies and devoted 
enormous resources to the construction of a fence of fortresses on the empire’s most 
important borders. However, the empire, reduced in size and surrounded by foes, founded its 
strategy even upon the ability of cities to resist behind their own fortifications rather than 
frontier defense. Major and minor urban centers alike were provided with increasingly 
expensive and powerful walls, and expected to survive for longer and longer periods without 
assistance from the central field armies.
47
 The character of relief that cities could expect also 
changed from the fourth to the sixth century: the empire increasingly aimed not to destroy 
invaders outright, but to use diplomacy, harassment and scorched earth policies to speed their 
withdrawal.
48
 
The fortification and garrisoning of the city greatly transformed the relationship 
between urban populations and the emperor. When the emperor’s armies had guarded the 
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frontiers and cities were unfortified in the Roman period, the security promised by the state 
required virtually no civilian participation. 
 While the emperor continued to claim a provision of total protection to go with his 
total power, from the perspective of the inhabitants of a Byzantine city, the security provided 
by the imperial state had become far more complex and limited. The state had indeed 
provided fortifications to contain invaders outside of urban space and provide refuge to rural 
inhabitants. However, these walls had to be manned and managed to provide effective 
security. While the state attempted to provide this component in the form of military 
garrisons, in many occasions the state often relied upon local civilians to defend their own 
cities with little or no assistance. 
 Byzantine sources present roughly three ways for a besieger to successfully conquer a 
city: force, starvation and treason. A successful defender must counter against all three of 
these threats by successfully resisting the efforts of the enemy to breach the wall, by 
stockpiling enough resources to outlast them and by maintaining the loyalty of all those 
within the city. While their exact view shifts slightly over time with the fortunes of the 
empire and the character of cities, Byzantine manuals as a rule pronounce the civilian 
population as integral to all three elements of siege defense. 
Maurice’s Strategikon, written in the sixth century by or for Emperor Maurice, 
advocates that the population of cities be “invited” to defend their own walls. While the 
garrison ought to command the defense, for the Strategikon’s author, the “civil population” 
of the city is an important group that plays a determinative role: capable both of bolstering 
defense or rebelling against the garrison and undermining defense completely. The 
Strategikon advises that while the all-important gates, storehouses and cisterns should be 
kept monitored by loyal soldiers, civilians should be encouraged to defend their walltop. 
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If the civil population stays in the city, they too must join with the men distributed 
along the wall to help the soldiers. This keeps them too busy to plan an uprising, and 
it also entrusts them with some responsibility for the defense of the city and makes 
them ashamed to rebel.
49
 
In Maurice’s Strategikon, inviting civilians to defend the walls is as much about ensuring 
loyalty to prevent treason as it is to prevent the breach of the wall. While the Strategikon’s 
author advocates the provision of garrisons to provide the best possible security and political 
control, the civilian body certainly has military capacity as wall defenders. The Strategikon’s 
author makes it clear that any defenders, even civilians, ought to be enough to ensure a city’s 
basic safety requires only the full manning of the city wall, “It is obvious that as long as there 
are enough men the wall will be secure, but if one point is given up, all the rest will be 
endangered.”
50
 
 In the judgment of the Strategikon’s author, the civil population of a city possessed 
the capacity to defend itself, if not as effectively as a military garrison. Indeed, there are 
several examples of civilians defending city walls with virtually no state assistance. 
 In the bleak seventh century, while the government’s focus was turned eastward due 
to devastating Arab conquests of Byzantine territory, many cities in the Balkans were left 
poorly garrisoned. While many settlements fell to invasion, several well-fortified cities such 
as Thessaloniki survived due to the efforts of their populations.
51
 Even Constantinople itself, 
the core of Byzantine defensive strategy, several times had to rely on civilians to defend its 
walls: “in 559, 601, 602, and 610, citizen corporations including the Blue and Green racing 
fans were mobilized to man the walls—and in 559 even the senators, or at least their retinues, 
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were summoned.”
52
 Purely local defense of walls never went away throughout imperial 
history: in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, it was not unheard of for fortified centers to 
be defended by civilians alone.
53
 
 However, manifestations of self-defense were not necessarily as extreme or obvious 
as senators and sports fans taking to the battlements. In many cases, cities were indeed 
garrisoned, but by soldiers with local loyalties, either raised from the local urban or rural 
population or simply having been emplaced in the same location long enough to “go native” 
and merge with the locals. The parallel tendencies of troops to put down roots where they 
were garrisoned unless frequently moved and the convenience to the state of devolving 
defensive responsibilities on the men locally available made such a union an increasing 
reality over the sixth and seventh centuries. Indeed, by the course of the sixth century, the 
limitanae dissolved into the outer regions of the empire, becoming little more than local 
militia. 
An anecdote provided by the seventh-century historian Theophylact Simocatta shows 
just how closely a garrison could identify with the civilian population of a city at the expense 
of the overall military. Simocatta describes how the citizens of Asemus, a town in the 
Balkans, refused to surrender their well-disciplined garrison to a passing general who 
demanded that they join his army.
54
 Indeed, according to Simocatta the soldiers of 
Ansemus’s garrison openly defied the generals by barricading themselves in the city’s 
church. When the general attempted to retrieve them by force, the entire town, including the 
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local bishop, resisted, ultimately expelling the general from their walls and forcing him to 
move on his campaign empty-handed.
55
 
In the seventh and eighth century, the sharp distinction between civil population and 
soldierly garrison began to break down entirely. The thematic system localized defense, 
putting the defense of city walls, urban citadels and fortresses in the hands of locally-raised 
military units, the cheapest expedient to make defense-in-depth of vast swathes of the empire 
possible.
56 57 
In many provinces, particularly in Eastern Anatolia, the state resorted entirely to 
a defense-in depth-strategy, most famously breaking the empire into multiple themes, or 
military districts, each of which was granted a military governor with chief political and 
military authority for his theme.
58
 Until the ninth century revival of Byzantine power, in 
Anatolia in particular, “isolated Byzantine fortress-settlements [depended] for much of the 
time on their own resources and initiative for their survival.”
59
  
 From the seventh century on, the defenders of a town, citadel or fortress can generally 
be assumed to be locals. In “Regional Identities and Military Power,” John Haldon and Hugh 
Kennedy go so far as to say that the army “replaces the urban populace of the empire as the 
voice of the provinces.”
60
 Indeed, Haldon and Kennedy believe that while the evidence is 
sparse, what evidence exists reveals that the view of local provincial units “cannot have been 
too different from the provincial population, for they were by this time recruited entirely 
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from the districts in which they were based, and probably well integrated into the provincial 
populations among whom they lived.”
61
 
 Even by the sixth century, many military manuals abandoned Maurice’s Strategikon’s 
sharp distinctions between soldier and civilian. An anonymous sixth century treatise on 
campaigning uses the terms “soldier” and “citizen” virtually interchangeably when 
describing the preparations defenders ought to take. For example, this treatise hopes against 
the “negligence” of the “besieged garrison” but a sentence later addresses a question directly 
to the community, asking in reference to undermining the wall, “How can the citizens deal 
with siege operations of this sort?”
62
 The text also advises the use of bed coverings of the 
citizens as emergency defensive mats to place on the walltop.
63
 Often, such terms are used 
interchangeably from sentence to sentence throughout the same document. The early tenth 
century manual On Resisting Sieges casually blurs the distinction between the defending 
soldiers and the able-bodied male population of a city by defining only women, children and 
the elderly as true non-combatants.
64
 Certainly, the potentially antagonistic duality between 
military-capable civilians and garrison postulated by Maurice’s Strategikon is difficult to 
find in later manuals. 
This change in the composition of defenders is deeply associated with a fundamental 
change in the character of fortified settlement. The integration of cities into the military 
environment was a ruthless battering that only the strongest fortifications could weather. In 
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some cases, cities shrank or relocated to smaller citadels located on the most defensible 
available terrain, losing their urban character almost entirely. However, even when the 
fortified perimeter of a settlement was small, under the thematic system the settlement’s 
actual defenders would likely be locals. The militarization of these locals is best understood 
as a continuation of the process that forced citizens to defend city walls, rather than its 
antithesis.  
Moreover, despite a degree of contraction, a great many Byzantine cities remained 
commercial and cultural population centers, such as Nicaea, Thessaloniki and 
Constantinople. In regard to these cities, and to numerous other less-illustrious survivors, we 
can reliably assume the presence of craftsmen, local aristocrats, the urban poor and other 
townsfolk. Most Byzantine cities fell along the middle of this spectrum, for example boasting 
both a town wall to repel raiders or bandits and a more powerfully fortified citadel to guard 
against military threats, or else shrinking drastically but retaining a population of craftsmen 
and other townsmen. Moreover, as even small fortifications served as refuges for masses of 
displaced civilians during warfare, civilian populations tended to be inside whatever walls 
existed and involved in defense when military decisions had to be made. 
From the initial fortification of cities in the fourth century on, Byzantine locals were 
capable of holding out against siege because they were provided with fortifications strong 
enough to fend off a wide range of attacks even when defended partly or wholly by relatively 
untrained people. As the author of a tenth-century treatise on skirmishing helpfully reminds 
“most of our fortified towns are built in strong, rugged locations” and many of these are so 
strong that they “have no reason to fear a siege” and can be safely neglected by a skirmishing 
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commander.
65
 As the Byzantine military adopted a strategy hinging upon the survival of 
relatively unaided fortified centers they sought to maximize the defensive capacity of cities 
in every way possible, ruthlessly sacrificing the grandeur, spaciousness and luxuries of the 
classical city in the name of maximizing security. A sixth century anonymous Byzantine 
treatise on strategy sternly recommends prioritizing defense over a “nice appearance,” 
I am not unaware that many people look to the present prosperity and believe in 
increasing it in every way. When they start planning to found large cities, they give 
no less weight to nice appearance than to security. They have built a number of such 
cities on level ground and beautified them with gardens, parks and lawns. But the way 
I look at it is that the outcome of what is happening these days is uncertain. Security, 
I think, is more important than a nice appearance. I prefer to have my city located and 
fortified in such a way as to render useless the machines of any besiegers.
66
 
The archaeological evidence confirms the judgment of manual authors that Byzantine urban 
fortifications were generally strong enough to allow a force of locals to mount credible 
resistance against the attacks of far superior foes.  
 Byzantine builders, well versed in Hellenistic defensive techniques, made city walls the 
sites of major defensive innovation and no two walls were alike. Thessaloniki’s fifth century 
walls featured large triangular projections equal in height with the curtain wall and with a 
continuous crenellated parapet, an entirely ‘unique’ innovation.
67
 Triangular and pentagonal 
towers were introduced to allow defenders maximum enfilading (flanking) fire while 
retaining the defensive advantages of angled construction.
68
 While not all circuits were as 
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technically advanced as those that ringed the empire’s greatest cities, even the smallest towns 
were walled. Walls were ubiquitous urban structures. 
 Many city walls had features that maximized the ability of untrained local militia to 
combat larger, better-equipped forces. These included a massing of towers to lend defending 
missile troops more enfilading (flanking) fire against the main wall and a proteichisma, a sort 
of secondary wall created by a ditch and a terrace which hindered bringing a ram against the 
main wall.
69
 
 Byzantine military manuals record with contempt the ignorance of many of the 
empire’s foes in the highly technical art of siege warfare. Even in the tenth century, the 
author of a Byzantine manual of siege defense could still declare that “the leaders of the 
foreign peoples in our time bear no resemblance to those of old in spirit or inventiveness, nor 
are they comparable in their forces, but fall short of them.”
70
 There were certainly 
exceptions: the sophisticated Persian monarchy possessed the resources and institutional 
muscle to reduce even the strongest fortifications. Moreover, over the centuries the technical 
gap between the Byzantines and their opponents shrank as technologies spread and dynamic 
new foes such as the Normans and Muslims appeared. However, even when an enemy 
boasted the ability to conduct one, the siege of any competently fortified location remained a 
grueling, risky undertaking for both sides whose outcome was never a certainty.
71
 
 Even Byzantine armies, who preserved a wide array of complex ancient siege 
techniques in theory and relied on a handful of simple ones in practice, preferred the far 
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cheaper tactics of trickery and betrayal.
72
 Overall, there was no revolution in siege warfare 
from the Roman into the Byzantine era and the defenders of city walls had a tenable, even 
advantageous position until the advent of gunpowder.
73
 
Byzantine cities made use of every geographical advantage to tilt the balance further 
in favor of defenders. The sixth century treatise on strategy recommends sites on “high 
ground with steep slopes,” “with rivers flowing around them” or best of all “sites on a 
promontory in the sea or in very large rivers connected to the mainland only be a very narrow 
isthmus.”
74
 
 The historical record shows that most of the cities that survived the waves of 
invasions and civil wars did so in part because they were sited in excellent locations to resist 
siege and circumvent embargo. The imperial capital Constantinople occupied a site that fit 
the sixth century author’s recommendations to the letter, occupying high ground on a 
triangular promontory surrounded by water on three sides. Thessaloniki, for many centuries 
the second city of the empire, stood on a coastal hilltop. 
However, the most impenetrable walls in the world would be worthless to a city 
lacked the provisions to outlast the besiegers. Military manuals unequivocally involve 
civilians in this element of defense as well. The tenth-century manual On Resisting Sieges 
advises a commander to get the population involved in stockpiling resources. The author 
writes that if it appears that the city is cut off from resupply, 
It is necessary to measure out together with the merchants and the wealthy wheat and 
barley and every type of legume from among the [items] in the warehouses and to 
store [them] in granaries and to entrust the distribution of these to the bishop of the 
city and to some other good citizens, in order that each of the people remaining my 
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control provisions for a month according to an edict to be made public and to make an 
announcement that those inhabitants who do not have more than thirty days of wheat 
should register with him.
75
 
Significantly, the military commander is advised to work through the authority of local 
leaders, such as prominent citizens, local elites and the bishop. This strongly suggests that 
should no military commander be available, local authorities would be able to organize 
defense on their own. The author also advises that the populace at large should be consulted 
in the evacuation process. The commander or the local authorities ought to 
…encourage the populace as to what is necessary in the crisis so that one group may 
readily choose relocation as a salvation and benefit for both groups, others defense of 
the fatherland, then to lead out of the city and send to another location the 
noncombatants, namely old men, the ill, children, women, beggars, and those who 
contribute nothing to those within on account of their own needs, so those within may 
be secure and those [leaving] not be harmed themselves.
76
 
The manual places heavy emphasis on the voluntary and persuasive character of this process. 
The tone is strikingly different than Maurice’s Strategikon in that civilian cooperation need 
not be carefully monitored and encouraged, but rather can be assumed as long as the 
commander works with local leaders and explains matters clearly to the population. This 
document reflects a far more militarized society in which siege warfare is a far more regular 
occurrence. Most strikingly, the manual advocates the enlistment of an extremely wide range 
of useful civilians: 
But as to those who are otherwise needy, but are able to provide common benefit 
through their own labors, namely arms manufacturers, engineers, siege machine 
operators, doctors, bronzesmiths, saddle-makers, bridlemakers, shoemakers, tailors, 
ropemakers, ladder climbers, oarmakers, builders, sailors, caulkers, architects, ladder 
climbers, oarmakers, builders, sailors, caulkers, architects, mill stone cutters, 
astronomers who contribute to discerning the movement of waters and winds, both 
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take the more accomplished among them to help you moreover organize and support 
them.
77
 
Civilians are important to defense as producers of military equipment, experts, medics and 
many other functions. 
During the aggressive reign of conquering ninth and tenth century emperors such as 
Basil II, the “Bulgar Slayer,” thematic units shrank to local militias or disappeared. By the 
time the aggressive policies petered out in the eleventh century and the empire once again 
found itself on the defensive, urban security was entrusted to static garrisons and militia 
primarily recruited from the local urban and rural population, often under the formal or 
informal leadership of local notables or lords.
78
 The main field armies of the empire became 
increasingly composed of foreign mercenaries, who might serve as city garrisons, but usually 
only in cities located in the area of major imperial campaigns. 
In the thirteenth century, when Constantinople was seized and sacked by Latin 
Crusaders and Venetians, the empire fractured into regional units centered upon the most 
important cities, such as Nicaea and Trebizon. By this point, the garrison, aristocrats and 
local populations of cities were so promiscuously interlinked that contemporaries such as 
Nicetas Choniates simply combine them, referring to the “Nicaeans” or “Prusaeans” and 
confidently grouping everyone resident in the city and the immediate agricultural area under 
this umbrella of shared interest. 
In the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, the evidence for the defense of fortifications 
by local civilians becomes profuse. For example, paramilitary locals serving as “guards, 
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watchmen and police” increasingly supplemented regular soldierly garrisons.
79
 This service 
might be professionalized to a degree, but was certainly undertaken by men drawn from the 
local population.
80
 While soldiers might be called in when invasion was expected, or be 
stationed in the largest cities, these local militias were expected to guard the gates, stand 
sentry on the walls and even man the defenses during ordinary circumstances.
81
 During 
actual sieges, such as the 1422 siege of Constantinople, full mobilization of civilians was 
common.
82
 
In fact, during the Late Byzantine period, many of the illusions of total imperial 
power disintegrated to the point that civilian participation in urban defense was actually 
celebrated as a political ideal. In the early fourteenth century, Thomas Magistros included the 
following endorsement of defensive citizen-militias in his treatise On the Relations of 
Citizens to the State. Magistros entirely rejects the distinction between civilian and soldierly 
activity, writing that, 
In order that those who practice crafts not be held in high repute for this alone and be 
[only] half as useful to the State, performing for their citizenship only works of peace, 
they should also have in their minds a spirit and a readiness for combat. Since it is not 
in the least necessary for us to divide life into peace and war… I urge each of these to 
possess arms of every sort. While they eagerly devote their time to and carefully do 
not neglect their usual works, whenever they enjoy leisure they should practice the 
use of arms and train for battle. Thus when enemies attack and lay siege, with such 
preparation they can stoutly oppose and completely withstand [them] … in addition to 
the armies the State has, these [militiamen] should also be held in high repute and 
defend [the State] physically.
83
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For Magistros, it is explicitly for the defense of the empire’s cities against siege that these 
militiamen ought to be employed at. In the late Byzantine period at least, civilian 
participation in warfare had moved from an embarrassment to an ideal. 
 While such examples are certainly distant from the rest of Byzantine history, given 
the lack of information about the everyday task of defense in earlier periods, fourteenth and 
fifteenth century evidence is at the very least a useful hint that civilian participation might 
have been a factor earlier as well. Two characteristics of these self-defense forces in 
particular could be considered applicable to earlier periods: first, that these groups were 
entirely defensive, tied to fortifications and oriented around the mundane but vital everyday 
tasks such as gatekeeping and sentry duty required to maintain the integrity of defense even 
in peacetime.
84
 Second, that these wall-defense militias were self-generated rather than 
instituted from above: products of the “independence and isolation” of Late Byzantine towns. 
The state had no interest in creating competing military units, and they existed where state 
authority was weakest and because the state was incapable of providing such services itself.
85
 
While the evidence is diverse and sparsely divided over a vast spatial and temporal 
area, it is possible to infer a general movement from the insulation of cities from warfare to 
their wholesale integration into the military environment. This integration took many forms, 
most notably the fortification of cities. As cities were integrated, so were their populations. 
This integration took a variety of forms, but throughout, the state was forced to rely upon 
locals to defend their walls, whether in the form of local garrisons, thematic troops, civil 
militias or simply a gang of craftsmen, circus fans and farmers. 
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The importance to urban defense of other factors certainly ought to be conceded: 
state-controlled garrisons were always an element and the power of local commanders, 
strategoi and governors often prevailed over the popular will. However, the increased 
participation and oversight of defense by locals, civilians and militias is a demonstrable 
phenomenon that ought not to be ignored. This phenomenon also should not be separated 
from the increasing fortification of urban areas and proliferation of other fortification types: 
the two were symbiotically connected. 
 The great paradox of Byzantine city walls is that while they were undeniably the 
product of the state’s patronage, they were in practice generally manned by citizens. While 
the emperor’s sacred responsibility to insulate his people from warfare gave him a monopoly 
over fortifications, the Byzantine state’s limited set of goals and resources often left 
Byzantine cities to their own devices during enemy invasions. During actual warfare, the 
survival of cities depended upon fortifications manned by the local population and the urban 
organism was thrust rudely into the military environment with little support. 
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6. Chapter III: The Contractual Nature of Urban Defense 
 
 What were the political consequences of the urban community’s involvement in 
urban defense? As we have described, historians have traditionally connected this 
involvement with a loss of political autonomy. However, fortifications actually forced 
communities into exercising political agency. As we have shown, the emperor’s claim that 
his walls and armies could shield civilians from warfare without assistance was a highly 
tenuous one, and citizens had to defend their own walls. But defending a city did not only 
demand military participation: the everyday reality of security was a politically charged task 
that required citizens to make political choices about their allegiance. 
 Because when citizens were participants in military activity, rather than passive 
recipients of it, the military relationship between the emperor and the town acquired a 
contractual element, in practice if not in theory. As long as the emperor relied upon the local 
population’s performance in a military role, he lost some small but very real portion of the 
absolute power he claimed over military activity. Emperors counted upon citizens to defend 
their walls until they could relieve them, while citizens counted upon that relief. Again, in the 
cases in which defense was conducted with little or no civilian participation, say by the 
garrison or the governor, the contractual relationship was between those parties and the 
emperor. But whenever and to whatever degree civilians were involved in city defense, they 
took held down this role. 
 For urban defense to be successful it was essential that both parties convinced the 
other to fulfill their responsibility. Even if a city mounted a fearless defense behind 
impregnable walls, if the emperor failed to help, the city would likely fall by starvation 
eventually. Equally, even if an emperor commanded an army capable of annihilating a 
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besieger, if the citizens had so little faith in him that they yielded without a fight before the 
first imperial troops began their march, the strongest soldiers and best generals in the world 
would be incapable of preventing surrender. 
 That emperors counted upon city defenders to hold out against invaders or rebels is 
fairly self-explanatory. In its section on military crimes, Maurice’s Strategikon firmly states 
that a commander who surrenders a fortress or city to an enemy should suffer capital 
punishment.
86
 Less formally, for the commander, garrison and/or local population to 
surrender a walled city while able to defend it was considered dishonorable, cowardly and 
unmanly. When the rebellious Nicaeans decided to surrender their city to the besieging 
emperor Andronikos, Nicetas Choniates disapprovingly writes that they “succumbed to 
womanish softness, and none cherished the idea of performing deeds of virtue.”
87
 
However, defenders were only obliged to hold out as long as they were able, and 
were not expected to die in defense if the situation of their fortifications or supplies was 
hopeless. Maurice’s Strategikon qualifies its severe proscription of the death penalty by only 
mandating it in cases in which the defending commander surrendered “while able to defend” 
the stronghold or else while not “compelled by danger to life.”
88
 
In fact, not only were surrenders considered acceptable if the defenders had run out of 
resources, but they were considered to reflect badly upon the emperor who had failed to 
relieve his loyal city for such a lengthy period of time. In The Alexiad, Anna Komnena 
transcribes a letter sent to Emperor Alexios by the governor of the city of Larissa, then 
besieged by Normans. This letter boldly lays out that prompt relief was expected of an 
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emperor if he was to live up to his promise to provide military protection, and that in the 
specific case at hand if Alexios failed to send aid, the allegiance owed to him by Larissa 
would be forfeit. The governor writes, 
I would like you to know, Majesty, that I have through now preserved this fortress 
from capture through my own great efforts. But we are now deprived of victuals 
which Christian men may eat; we have even touched what is not lawful. Even that has 
failed us. If you are willing to hurry to our aid and can drive off the besiegers, thanks 
be to God. If not, I have already fulfilled my duty. From now on we are the slaves of 
necessity (for what can man do against nature and tyranny she imposes?). We have a 
mind to surrender the place to the enemies who press us hard and are clearly 
strangling us. If this should be our unhappy lot—call down curses on me if you like, 
but I will speak boldly and frankly to your majesty: unless you hurry with all speed to 
deliver us from this peril (for we are unable to hold out for much longer), you, our 
emperor, if you do not bring aid quickly when you have the power to do so, you will 
be the first to be charged with treachery.
89
 (emphasis mine) 
Whether this extraordinary document was faithfully transcribed or entirely invented by Anna, 
it admirably exemplifies the relation between city defenders and the emperor’s relieving 
forces. For the governor of Larissa, Alexios Komnenos’s legitimacy as emperor is entirely 
contingent upon his ability to fulfill his military responsibilities to his subjects. In this view, 
an emperor who failed to relieve a city was just as much a traitor as the defenders who failed 
to hold one. 
 Byzantine sources judge emperors who fail to rescue besieged cities quite harshly. 
Nicetas Choniates condemns Emperor Andronikos I’s complacent, incompetent response to 
the late twelfth century invasion of the empire by Sicilian Normans. According to Nicetas, 
Andronikos “was not man enough to repel the barbarians.”
90
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 Requests for relief like this one were politically charged documents, and a competent 
ruler understood that they demanded an immediate response. According to Anna, when her 
royal father read the above ultimatum, far from being affronted by its “frank” tone, he 
immediately sprung into action, working feverishly through the night to devise a scheme to 
relieve the city. Indeed, Alexios considered the rescue of Larissa such a priority that he 
sought the assistance of a wide array of advisors, including his best generals, an old man 
from Larissa with local knowledge and even St. Demetrios, who helpfully promised the 
fretful ruler success in a dream.
91
 Even if we put such a dramatic response down to Anna 
Komnena’s desire to highlight her father’s concern for his subjects’ safety, this episode 
reveals that to take such a letter seriously and respond to it effectively was considered a trait 
of a capable ruler. 
 Because the contractual obligations of both city and ruler hinged upon their ability to 
respectively resist and relieve, correctly gauging that ability was crucial to both parties. 
However, determining how effectively and how long a given city could resist was a delicate, 
complex task. A great many factors had to be taken into account, including the strength of the 
fortifications and the amount of resources a city possessed. A tenth century manual 
recommends a city threatened with siege stockpile enough provisions to last “perhaps six 
months or a year,” and this figure is made assuming that a substantial portion of the 
population would be evacuated.
92
 Moreover, one required familiarity with both the strength 
of the fortifications under threat and the siege capability of the specific enemy that threatened 
it. A great many Byzantine treatises and manuals take this necessity into account: for 
example, Maurice’s Strategikon carefully defines the siege capacity of each potential enemy 
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of the empire (the Persians are experts, the Slavs novices, the Western Europeans are too 
impatient for lengthy encirclements, and so on) while Constantine Porphyrogenitus’s On 
Imperial Administration summarizes the quality of the fortifications for every major city in 
the imperial frontier areas.
93
 
 From the perspective of the emperor, providing relief was a delicate matter because 
rescuing a given city was both time sensitive and potentially only one among many military 
and non-military commitments he could face at any given moment. From the perspective of 
the townsfolk, the choice to resist or yield was especially weighty because from the moment 
citizens committed to defying a siege, they often condemned their community to total ruin if 
the siege was successful. A city had to balance both their capacity to resist against the 
likelihood of imperial relief and the results of a failed defense with the consequences of an 
immediate surrender. 
 Even if a siege was successfully resisted and relieved, resistance was an expensive 
and labor-intensive task. Most immediately, walls needed to be repaired and ditches emptied 
of detritus and eroded earth. But repairing the fortifications only cost time and effort: siege 
preparations could also damage a city’s economy before the enemy even arrived. The tenth-
century manual on city defense advises that it is necessary “to reap the fields, even if they are 
not ready for reaping” before the enemy arrived.
94
 This might sound like a minor detail, but 
in many regions of the empire, agriculture was delicate, producing only a low surplus and 
heavily reliable on variable conditions of climate, soil fertility and rainfall. If a premature 
harvest was likely to bring economic ruin and starvation, locals had a powerful incentive to 
surrender to any invader who demonstrated mild intentions, for example a pretender who 
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sought political control rather than plunder or enslavement. It might also be necessary not 
only to bring flocks and herd of livestock inside the walls, but also to slaughter them and salt 
the meat, so as to turn the animals into immediate food resources rather than mouths to 
feed.
95
 Beasts of burden, mules and even horses were to receive the same treatment if 
supplies were low.
96
 Many people also had to be evacuated, both from the countryside to 
fortified towns and from fortified towns away from the region under threat.
97
 Most 
devastatingly to local agriculture, in the event of siege the state might employ scorched earth 
policies to leave nothing for besiegers to survive on. 
 While attackers might spare the fields and villages around a city as bargaining chips 
to encourage a negotiated surrender, once invaders were rebuffed and committed to a siege 
everything outside the walls was forfeited to the enemy. Byzantine sources recount the 
devastating effects repeated sieges could have upon agricultural infrastructure and village 
society, even if no enemies succeeded in penetrating the fortified nucleus of the local city, 
fortress or refuge center. In the case of a city divided into a lower and upper city, if the whole 
or some portion of the inhabitants chose to make a stand in the stronger upper citadel, the 
lower city would likely suffer heavily. 
 Of course, surrender could be a dangerous option too. Many of the empire’s enemies 
came to the empire for the specific purpose of extracting wealth, food, slaves and other 
plunder and returning home. While a city might be able to bargain an enemy down on how 
much they sought to steal if the city surrendered on terms, many enemies, such as the 
nomadic Avars and Huns had little respect for treaties with cities and were capable of 
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continually upping the terms in their favor.
98
 Obviously, when negotiations were concluded 
and the enemy allowed inside, the vulnerability of the inhabitants to deal breaking drastically 
increased. If an invader sought conquest, surrender could result in the replacement of the 
dominant elites of a town by an outside group, the seizure by immigrants of the surrounding 
farmland and dramatic changes in religion and culture. It should be kept in mind however, 
that given the oppressive weight of the Byzantine state’s demands for soldiers and taxes, 
regime change could also significantly lighten the yoke communities labored under. 
 Unquestionably, worst possibility facing a city would be the consequences of a 
successful resistance to siege that was left unrelieved so long that the attackers penetrated the 
walls by storm or starved the city into submission after a grueling, mutually embittering 
slugfest. In such cases, a city could reasonably expect to suffer unrestrained massacre, rape 
and plunder and the wholesale demolition of the city’s built environment.
99
  Even if they 
survived, citizens might suffer enslavement and deportation, often on mass scale: the 
Persians famously enslaved the entire populations of town, as did the Huns and other 
Northern nomadic groups.
100
 
 Nicetas Choniates’s harrowing contemporary account of the 1204 Sack of 
Constantinople by the Fourth Crusaders demonstrates how terrifying the fall of a city to the 
mercy of invaders could be. Choniates places the following speech at his own departure from 
the conquered city. 
‘O imperial City,’ I cried out, ‘City fortified, city of the great king, tabernacle of the 
most High, praise and song of his servants and beloved refuge for strangers, queen of 
the queens of cities, song of songs and splendor of splendors, and the rarest vision of 
the rare wonders of the world, who is it that has torn us away from thee like darling 
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children from their adoring mother? What shall become of us? Wither shall we go? 
What consolation shall we find in our nakedness, torn from they bosom as from a 
mother’s womb? When shall we look upon thee, not as thou now art, a plain of 
desolation and a valley of weeping, trampled by armies and despised and rejected, but 
exalted and restored, revered by those who humbled thee, and once again sucking the 
milk of the Gentiles and eating the wealth of kings? When shall we doff these 
shriveled and tattered rags which, like fig leaves and garments of skins, suffice not to 
cover the whole body and which the foreigners, as treacherous as the serpent, forced 
upon us with attendant evils and injuries?”
101
 
Nicetas’s narrative attempts to convey the violation and destruction of the sack with every 
rhetorical, religious and cultural tool at his educated disposal. The city is invaded by 
desolation in the Biblical sense and his family and community’s ejection from the city is an 
expulsion from Eden. The crime is very much a religious one, a violation of sanctuary, of 
God’s chosen space. 
Choniates also identifies the sack metaphorically and concretely with rape and 
violence against women. Choniates compares Constantinople to a beautiful noblewoman in 
luxurious garments who has been savagely attacked by “implacable and crazed suitors” and 
now lies beaten and dirty with torn clothes.
102
 He also describes her as a mother reduced to a 
widow, her children scattered and killed.
103
 His actual narrative of the sack is also filled with 
descriptions of rape, centering upon Nicetas’s efforts to protect his wife and daughters from 
the invaders by hiding in the home of a former servant of Venetian ancestry and finally by 
fleeing the city entirely.
104
 For Nicetas, the city is a domestic, feminine space that had been 
murderously violated. 
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Nicetas explicitly locates this violation of his city at the city walls. As he is leaving 
the city and before his final lament, Nicetas directs a curious speech at the walls themselves. 
As we left the City behind… I threw myself, just as I was, on the ground and 
reproached the walls both because they alone were insensible, neither shedding tears 
nor lying ruins upon the earth, and because they still stood upright. ‘If those things for 
whose protection you were erected no longer exist, being utterly destroyed by fire and 
war, for what purpose do you still stand? And what will you protect hereafter unless 
you strive to bring destruction to the enemy in the day of wrath…?
105
 
For Choniates, the walls exist to protect and enclose urban, sacred, feminine space from 
monstrous, godless barbarians. Their survival when they have failed at this task is a sick joke 
to him, a dereliction of duty that could only be atoned for if the walls could somehow help 
God destroy the wicked in the Last Judgment. One more detail links the violation of the city 
specifically with the violation of the walls: according to Choniates, some of the crusaders 
sent Constantinople’s city gates home as trophies, along with the chain that had barred the 
city harbor, a malignant gesture of contempt for the city’s sanctity.
106
 For Choniates, only the 
elevated terminology of religion could encompass the horror a city faced if it resisted and 
was taken by force. 
 When a failed resistance could have such nightmarish conclusions, a city was 
certainly capable of surrendering on terms, particularly if they had already put up an 
honorable fight first. In The Alexiad, Anna Komnena describes how the citizens of 
Dyrrakhion, a Byzantine city on the Adriatic coast besieged by invading Normans under 
Robert Guiscard, gave up on the prospect of imperial rescue and decided collectively to 
surrender the city, 
When they [the people of the town] learnt of the misfortunes of the emperor, the 
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terrible carnage and the deaths of so many remarkable men, not to mention the 
withdrawal of the fleets and Robert’s decision to renew the siege in the coming 
spring, they thought long and hard about how they could ensure their safety better in 
the future and about how they could avoid taking such risks again. They gathered 
therefore, and after each man had expressed his own private opinion and when they 
failed to agree on a common course, they decided to resolve the impasse by 
submitting to Robert and surrendering the town. Instigated by one of the colonists 
from Amalfi and in obedience to their advice, they opened the gates and allowed him 
to enter.
107
 
The surrender of the city is certainly a politically charged action. While we might argue 
about whether the defenders were garrison troops or civilians, Anna Komnena provides 
compelling, local details to suggest why the defenders were inclined to surrender: the 
insurance of future safety and the avoidance of military risks. The surrender of the city is also 
intimately bound up in the city’s walls: the decision to open or close its gates. 
Perhaps unsurprisingly under such conditions, emperors were keen to convince 
citizens of their ability to defend themselves long enough to be relieved. There were several 
ways an emperor could bolster the confidence and defensive expertise of citizen defenders. 
The cheapest (and least effective) option was to simply send the citizens of a threatened city 
a letter of encouragement and advice. While such a letter was hardly equivalent to material 
aid, it could lend a community some fraction of soldierly expertise on resisting sieges. Most 
importantly, it was at least evidence that the emperor was aware the city was threatened, and 
hopefully only the first sign of more substantial assistance to come. 
These letters generally contain much the same advice found in Byzantine military 
manuals, offering optimistic predictions as long as certain key rules and precepts are 
followed closely. A letter from Alexios Komnenos to the towns located on or off the Adriatic 
coast threatened with Norman invasion in the late eleventh century, “earnestly exhorted” the 
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commanders and the inhabitants themselves “not to lose heart, nor to relax their efforts in any 
way, but to be watchful and sober, providing all-round protection for themselves and keeping 
a wary eye open for Robert.”
108
 Another such round of letters to coastal cities and their 
commanders were necessary later in Alexios’s reign when Greece proper was threatened with 
Western invasion.
109
 
 Sources from across Byzantine history refer to such letters in tones ranging from 
approval to mockery. A letter from Synesius, written in 405 when the philosopher and future 
bishop was resident in his native city of Cyrene, Libya, is rich with sarcastic contempt for the 
letters of advice sent to Cyrene by Cerialis, the chief commander of the province. 
A little ship is carrying us letters from him enjoining us to do exactly such things as 
we are doing now, namely, to keep within the walls, not to attempt any sortie from 
the trenches, not to give combat to an enemy who is unconquerable. If we do not obey 
him, he protests that he will not answer for the consequences. Then again he advises 
us to establish four watches in the night, as if our hopes lay in matters, like a man 
who is accustomed to misfortune.
110
 
Synesius finds the letters redundant, restrictive and petty; poor substitutes for real assistance. 
A number of other sources echo the Libyan philosopher’s low opinion.  
A more effective method of lifting the morale of frightened civilians was to send 
them an experienced military commander, ideally accompanied by at least a handful of loyal, 
skilled soldiers. Such a figure could convince a city that resisting siege was achievable while 
providing them the knowledge necessary to do so. In another sense, the provision of a 
commander or a garrison also took the decision out of the hands of the citizens. However, 
even when this was true, such an assumption of responsibility for defense from the citizens 
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by a confident representative of the state was essentially a fulfillment of the emperor’s 
contractual obligation and should be seen in that light. For example, Anna Komnena recounts 
how her father sent George Palaiologos, one of his closest associates, to direct the defense of 
Dyrrachion. According to Anna, George Palaiologos did an impressive job, raising morale, 
maintaining vigilance and organizing the technical, disciplined efforts required to counter or 
destroy siege engines. 
 Of course, a cowardly or incompetent commander could actually make matters worse. 
In the early fifth century, Synesius of Cyrene described the provincial general, Cerialis, as 
“unfit for war and a real nuisance during peace.” According to Synesius, Cerialis abandoned 
the cities under his charge in a merchant ship filled with gold. Synesius’s damning verdict of 
the man was “he took very good care not to share our troubles. Instead of being upon the 
ramparts, like me, Synesius the philosopher, the general keeps himself close to the oar-
blade.”
111
 
 On the other side of Byzantine history, Nicetas Choniates blames the 1185 fall of 
Thessaloniki to the Latins on the incompetent, even traitorous leadership of David 
Komnenos. According to Choniates, the Thessalonicans were not “helpless and unskilled in 
warfare” and “forcefully urged” their “governor and commander” to lead them on the walltop 
and in sallies, but David was “more effeminate than woman and more cowardly than the 
deer” and “remained a spectator rather than antagonist of the enemy troops,” refusing even to 
wear armor.
112
 Nicetas damns David, a “pirate,” a “sorcerer” and a “traitor,” entirely 
responsible for Thessaloniki’s ultimate surrender. 
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 A bad commander reflected badly upon the emperor who sent him. For Nicetas, the 
fearsome, tyrannical policies of Emperor Andronikos had alienated or destroyed all the 
virtuous, brave men in the Byzantine world, leaving only evasive cowards: “[Andronikos] 
thus brutally deprived his own reign of those who excelled in bodily strength and military 
excellence.”
113
 Of David, Nicetas writes, “in his constant dread of Andronikos he was most 
adroit only in seeking ways to escape his irresistible hands by hiding.”
114
 
However, the emperor did not only need to convince the defenders of their capacity to 
defend themselves for a good period of time; he also needed to convince them that he would 
eventually arrive to rescue them. From the perspective of townsfolk, the emperor could often 
appear an extremely unreliable ally. Townsfolk faced a variety of threats from bandits and 
raiders to full-blown invasions, and they generally expected to weather many of these 
without state assistance. Through Byzantine history, whatever the military system offered by 
the state, cities were often left to fend for themselves. 
 The example of the city of Ansemus’s refusal to surrender their garrison to bolster the 
army of a passing general in the late sixth century shows the gulf that could exist in the 
perceptions of the military and a town about what security entailed.
115
 While the citizens of 
Ansemus were certainly grateful for the presence of a relieving force, they recognized that its 
presence was only a temporary relief, and that they would be left to cope with everyday 
insecurity alone soon enough, and needed to hang onto every defensive asset for dear life. 
 The independent military-political agency urban populations often held during sieges 
thoroughly contradicted the imperial claim to a monopoly over military activity. However, 
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this contradiction was generally resolved not by dangerous civic declarations of 
independence, but by the adoption of a more contractual understanding of defense, in which 
both urban defenders and the emperor are understood to have distinct obligations, which both 
parties are expected to fulfill out of honor and mutual self-interest. 
However, in some cases, Byzantine cities actually held out independently against 
threats without any imperial assistance, generally during periods of state over-commitment or 
internal conflict. Interestingly, even when a Byzantine community successfully defended 
itself with no help from the emperor, the citizens shied away from trumpeting a narrative of 
urban self-reliance or autonomy. Rather than thus attracting the attention and ire of the 
paranoid Byzantine state, Byzantine self-defense was credited to timely relief by warrior-
saints or other forms of divine intervention. While the governor of Larissa might have been 
bold enough to call out Alexios as a traitor when his city’s survival depended upon a quick 
rescue, if independent defense went well, once the threat was gone citizens felt little need to 
rock the boat, however dire their situation had been beforehand. While the Patriarch Photius 
of Constantinople might have lamented the absence of the emperor and his armies when 
Scandinavian Vikings suddenly advanced on Constantinople in 860, after the invaders were 
turned back without a fight by the sight of the walls, Photius was happy to credit the Virgin 
Mary and her icon for this victory and let the issue of imperial negligence drop.  
In fact, in many cases divine intervention was described in exactly the same terms as 
imperial relief, Constantine Porphyrogenitus describes how when the town of Patras drove 
off its Slavic and Saracen besiegers with a successful sally, they attributed their success to 
the appearance of St. Andrew leading their charge.
116
 On several occasions, the defenders of 
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Middle Byzantine Thessalonica, even when their enemies quitted the city’s walls before 
imperial assistance arrived or indeed was even sought, did not credit such repulses to their 
own autonomous action, but rather to the rescue provided by St. Demetrios, who they record 
rode up to the gates armed and armored leading a large company of saintly soldiers, exactly 
mimicking the attitude of a relieving emperor.
117
 And yet, in reality, in these cases 
Thessalonica owed their security solely to the strength of their walls and the intrepid efforts 
of local defenders. 
The paradox between the doughty willingness of Byzantine citizens to defend their 
own walls and their bashful evasion of the credit for such action was the product of the broad 
but shallow scope of imperial power. In the historian Leonora Neville’s apt words, the 
imperial administration “maintained a monopoly on sovereignty while being apathetic about 
governing.”
118
 Thus, while no party dared to actually act as a government or claim political 
power, people were free to act so long as they characterized their activity as apolitical, in line 
with the imperial will or otherwise kept below the radar. Indeed, Neville argues that people 
could actually engage in rebellious acts such as defying tax collectors, but only if they did so 
without explicitly rejecting the emperor or were quick to accept his offers of forgiveness and 
ritual punishment. 
 The risks of actually claiming political power and defying the imperial will were 
enormous. The censorious late fourth century sermons of Bishop John Chrysostom to the 
citizens of Antioch, preached in the wake of the city’s tax-rebellion and destruction of the 
statues of Emperor Theodosius II and his wife, transcribes a plea to the emperor for 
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clemency. The penitent, pleading, self-punishing letter hammers home the ideological and 
material impossibility of repelling an emperor’s wrath behind walls. 
We must confess, O Emperor, this love which you have shewn towards our country! 
We cannot deny it! On this account, especially, we mourn, that a city thus beloved 
has been bewitched by demons; and that we should have appeared ungrateful towards 
her benefactor, and have provoked her ardent lover. And although you were to 
overthrow; although you were to burn; although you were to put to death; or whatever 
else you might do, you would never yet have taken on us the revenge we deserve. We 
ourselves have, by anticipation, inflicted on ourselves what is worse than a thousand 
deaths! For what can be more bitter, than when we are found to have unjustly 
provoked our benefactor, and one who loved us so much, and the whole world knows 
it, and condemns us for the most monstrous ingratitude! If Barbarians had made an 
incursion on our city,
 
and razed its walls, and burnt its houses, and had taken and 
carried us away captive, the evil had been less. And why so? but because, whilst you 
live, and continue such a generous kindness towards us, there might be a hope that we 
might again be brought back to our former condition, and regain a more illustrious 
liberty. But now, having been deprived of your favour, and having quenched your 
love, which was a greater security to us than any wall, whom have we left to fly to? 
Where else shall we have to look, when we have provoked so benign a lord, so 
indulgent a father?
119
 
For the Antiochene messenger, or at least Chrysostom, open defiance of a sitting emperor is 
an unthinkable crime bearing incredible risks. In a climate in which any claim to political 
authority was an act of open rebellion, the decision making process of urban and rural 
communities was often highly informal and collective. Indeed, elites such as local aristocrats 
and bishops, while they held significant authority, sought to use their prestige to gather 
support for their ideas to make them collective rather than pull rank and wield power as a 
weapon.
120
 Nicetas Choniates’s account of the role of the local bishop upon the city of 
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Nicaea’s twelfth century surrender to the Emperor Andronikos establishes this communal 
dynamic. According to Choniates, 
Nicholas, the archbishop of Nicaea, realized the grim realities of the situation and 
argued for the necessity to be generous. Summoning the people to the church, he 
proposed that they yield to the times and circumstances. [a description of the 
archbishops various arguments follows, including the point that] … the Nicaeans 
were little by little abandoning the watch and ward of the city and inclining towards 
the cause of peace. Everyone considered the archbishop’s suggestion a good one, and 
he grasped the ensuing good with both hands.
121
 
The archbishop’s influence requires persuasion and his solution is a suggestion rather than 
order that the general body of the people must accept to be undertaken. In Neville’s terms,  
Because the imperial administration ensured that no rival group would act as a 
government, the regulation of provincial society was informal and variable. Anyone 
could try to influence the course of local matters and no one was guaranteed 
authority. The authority to regulate behavior in Byzantine provincial society was 
therefore particularly fluid and subject to community consensus.
122
 
In this environment, communities had every reason to deny responsibility for their own 
successful defense and accept the imperial narrative of a rescuing emperor, even if they had 
to rely on visions of saintly rescuers to do so. Making decisions that would protect 
themselves without challenging the emperor’s claim to power was only one more issue towns 
had to consider and negotiate. 
 However, while the Thessalonicans were content to hide their independent military 
agency in humble narratives of religious rescue, some cases reveal the defensive capacities of 
cities unveiled by religion or politic humility. On the fringes of the empire, a number of cities 
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were so neglected by the empire that they drifted into a state of full political autonomy.
123
 At 
least fourteen ex-Byzantine city-states can be attested, mostly concentrated in Italy, Dalmatia 
and the Black Sea, famous examples including Venice, Naples, Amalfi, Cherson and 
Ragusa/Dubrovnik.
124
 Constantine Porphyrogenitus explicitly blames the imperial state’s 
inattention for these instances, citing “the sloth and inexperience of those in power.”
125
 
The case of these cities proves that imperial control of urban communities relied upon 
the contractual provision of relief, garrisons and commanders. These cities, like the great 
survivors within the empire’s borders, benefitted from a strong geographical location and/or 
sturdy fortifications. Many of these are still visible today. The powerful walls (heavily 
modified since the Byzantine era) and Adriatic cliff-side locale of modern Dubrovnik make 
the city a popular tourist destination, while Venice’s semi-artificial occupation of a lagoon 
famously rendered the city immune to land-based siege. When the state failed to relieve these 
cities, they were forced to rely on their own defenses, and their success reveals the hardiness 
and self-reliance of medieval Mediterranean cities that we must delve through layers of 
imperial propaganda to discover in Byzantine cities such as Thessaloniki. In fact, the 
commercial success of these cities when relieved from the burden of supporting the 
Byzantine state suggests that many cities might have been better off independent. Indeed, in a 
dark twist of fate, the queen of cities herself, Constantinople, would labor under the 
commercial yoke of Venice for centuries and even suffer its first sack in almost a millennium 
at the hands of these former colonials.
126
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 However, independence from imperial protection came with dangers, and secure 
location and disposable wealth might prove insufficient sources of security when these cities 
found themselves faced with a formidable military foe. At such desperate moments, 
Byzantine rulers were presented with a golden window of opportunity to re-assert some 
measure of control by renewing the contractual provision of relief. Constantine 
Porphyrogenitus recounts how when Ragusa and other Dalmatian cities were attacked by 
capable Saracen forces, they requested relief from the emperor, who snapped up the 
opportunity to re-incorporate this slew of towns into the empire as a rescuer rather than a 
conqueror.
127
 Most of these cities drifted in a political purgatory for much of Byzantine 
history, oscillating from exarchates and themes to autonomous city-states or else vassals of 
neighboring powers.
128
 
 In sum, fortifications structured the military-political relationship between citizens 
and emperors in a very particular way by giving cities the resources to survive independently 
of state assistance for a period of time but leaving them generally reliant upon eventual 
imperial relief. Fortifications made urban allegiance (that is their resistance or surrender to 
external siege) conditional: dependent upon the emperor’s willingness and ability to provide 
rescue and to bolster their defenses. If an emperor failed to provide such resources or 
convince local defenders of his willingness to do so, he was incapable of maintaining a city’s 
allegiance. To convince them, the performance, persuasion and demonstration of imperial 
strength was of crucial importance. Byzantine emperors had to prove to cities that they were 
capable of fulfilling the imperial ideal of guardianship through performance, persuasion and 
above all prompt, decisive action. 
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 Until this point, we have considered walls only as structures that attempt to exclude 
warfare from urban space by restricting the movements of armies. Byzantine imperial 
ideology defined this role explicitly in terms of the restriction of foreign invaders from 
Christian, Roman space. In this scheme, any movement of a foreign invader into a city, 
whether peaceful or forceful was fundamentally a failure, the only question being whether 
the blame for this failure lay with the citizens or the emperor. Moreover, as long as there was 
a single emperor, the fact that his reception was left in the hands of locals was 
inconsequential: Byzantine ideology allowed for no rebellion. The power of citizens over 
their walls was limited by the contractual reliance upon relief, not to mention the general 
need for garrisons, commanders and of course, the walls themselves. 
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7. Chapter IV: The Negotiation of Imperial Authority: Political Theater at the City 
Gates 
 
 During civil warfare, imperial claimants competed to appear as legitimate emperors 
themselves and castigate their rivals as treasonous usurpers. In this world, even the least 
politically ambitious city was suddenly forced to choose sides. In response, emperors 
jockeyed to perform as benevolent protectors and avoid playing the role of a bloodthirsty 
rebel. Because, as we have seen, imperial legitimacy was closely connected to a positive, 
protective relationship with city walls, a festive welcoming entrance was traditionally a 
powerful validation of a claimant’s authority as a legitimate protective ruler. Rejection and 
the commencement of siege warfare, on the other hand, placed a claimant in an awkward 
position: that of a rebel or worse yet, in the position of the very impious, destructive invaders 
that the emperor was supposed to protect cities from. 
 Wherever communities controlled their own walls, they were in a position to 
determine the reception given to an imperial claimant, and in this sense, controlled that 
claimant’s legitimacy. Because the military relationship between cities and the state was 
partly contractual, ideology and practical reality placed cities in a position from which they 
could choose which emperor to accept. 
 In the military narrative, we have seen that the integration of the Byzantine city into 
the military environment resulted in civilian participation in and sometimes management of 
the defense of urban fortifications. Urban populations played an important role in 
determining whether a city resisted or surrendered during a foreign invasion, and in how 
defense was to be conducted. 
 If the authority of the Byzantine Emperor had remained unified and stable, the 
 
75 
importance of civilians to control their walls would have likely remained limited. Except on 
the most distant, neglected peripheries of the empire, few cities were foolish enough to 
openly defy the fearsome might of the emperor from behind their walls. 
 However, imperial authority was quite often divided, multiple and at war with itself. 
Throughout its history, the Byzantine Empire was repeatedly wracked by usurpation. 
Sometimes, jockeying for the throne was confined to the court, the palace or at least the 
capital, but on numerous occasions, it took the form of sprawling, ruinous civil wars 
involving the entire empire. The loose succession laws, the complexities of court and palace 
life and the close relation between military command and political power offered usurpers 
multiple paths to the throne. Such civil wars entirely disrupted the military system cities 
operated within. 
In the Byzantine Empire, as has been illustrated at length, authority was officially and 
publicly unitary and absolute, entirely reserved to and stemming from the imperial office. 
The consequence of this totalitarian centralization was that any assertion of political power 
by any subject was an absolute defiance of imperial authority. At the same time, as Leonora 
Neville ably points out, the empire was no modern, fascist autocracy: it did not seek actual 
control over social life, but merely aimed to restrict all other parties from political life. 
 Actual, overt defiance of imperial authority was a dangerous, all-or-nothing business 
because, in Neville’s words, “Byzantine political theory allowed the success of a revolt to be 
proof that the deposed emperor was a tyrant. The leader of a successful revolt was God’s 
agent in removing a tyrant and would rule as God’s regent on earth. The leader of an 
unsuccessful revolt, however, was a destroyer of the peace who rose against God’s regent on 
earth without justification.”
129
 Indeed, no Byzantine rebels claimed to be despisers of 
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imperial authority, but rather upholders of it. Both the rebel and the loyalist were equally 
loud in their professions of submission to the throne, differing on who the occupant should 
be. 
 This put Byzantine cities in a perilous, zero-sum position whenever they were faced 
with an individual claiming to be the rightful emperor. Either that person was the true 
emperor, in which case they owed him unquestioned loyalty and a triumphal invitation to 
enter the city, or else he was not, in which case they owed it to their rightful liege to shut 
their gates in this usurper’s face in the rudest possible manner. 
 While Byzantine cities rarely sought such choices, the capacity to determine the 
legitimacy of a ruler is unquestionably a form of political power. When dealing with an 
outside invader, the choices cities made were simply a matter of military calculation: 
weighing the best survival choice in light of the available circumstances. But when imperial 
legitimacy was at stake, the regulation of entrance became a political power that could be 
wielded against the state. My goal is to examine how citizens navigated this treacherous 
environment and assert that it was not merely the possession of fortifications, but the choices 
made with those fortifications, that allowed communities to survive. 
 The relationship between emperors and cities was, at least at the wall, negotiated and 
dependent upon the emperor’s ability to fulfill his obligations. Cities would much rather 
serve an emperor who lived up to imperial protective ideals than defy one who failed to 
conform to them. Regardless, cities sought to avoid imperial retribution, framing their 
choices in terms of submission to the absolute authority of the rightful emperor: that is, in 
exact accordance with the emperor’s formal authority. Cities exercised power while 
strenuously denying that they held any. 
 Cities did not only regulate actual passage of rulers, they also determined the 
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legitimacy of passage. This was an incredibly potent power: through their reception or 
rejection of an imperial figure, cities had the power to characterize him as a righteous fulfiller 
of imperial ideals or a tyrannical usurper bent on violating urban space. An emperor could 
indeed overcome this power with physical strength, but then he risked transforming himself 
into the precise opposite of imperial ideals—a tyrannical violator of urban space, a partisan 
of desolation and destroyer of cities. In civil wars, the position of urban communities was 
both more perilous and more powerful. 
 We have already discussed how Byzantine cities relied upon a contractual provision 
of relief and other support and emperors relied upon cities to defend their own walls 
whenever necessary. This relationship between cities and emperors was immensely 
complicated by civil warfare. During a foreign invasion, an emperor played the role of the 
rescuer, or else the besieger of enemy cities. During a civil war, by contrast, when multiple 
imperial armies supporting multiple claimants campaigned across the empire, emperors 
occupied an ambiguous position between two extremes without a middle ground: rebel 
usurper and rightful emperor. Not only did emperors now appear both as besieger and 
reliever, but also now occupied an ambiguous position between both roles. 
 A city’s decision to yield or resist suddenly took on an ambiguous appearance. In the 
case of a civil war, a surrender could now be characterized either as a desertion of a lawful 
liege or as a submission to a lawful liege. Similarly, defiance of an imperial claimant could 
now be cast as either an act of lawful allegiance or a gesture of as open rebellion against 
lawful imperial authority. An action could be cast in any of these lights, either at the time or 
in retrospect. 
 This fundamental ambiguity, founded upon the innate tension between defense, siege 
and relief found in regular warfare, made the reception a city gave to a would-be-emperor of 
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enormous importance for both parties. For a city, the grave consequences of open defiance of 
the true emperor were to be avoided at all cost. For an imperial claimant, the city wall was a 
stage upon which to demonstrate legitimacy and avoid the appearance of illegitimacy. 
During civil warfare, the wall played an ambiguous role: if an imperial candidate was 
legitimate, his ownership of the wall and mastery of urban space ought to be celebrated and 
the wall ought to serve as a stage for his triumphal entrance. However, if an imperial 
candidate was a usurper, the wall was a military barrier to be used to restrict the rebel’s 
attempt to violate urban space. The ambiguity of imperial legitimacy during civil wars made 
the character of any interaction at a city wall uncertain, determined by the reception of 
whoever controlled the city wall. This reception, in turn was highly determined by the 
performance of an imperial claimant before the gates. 
 Michael Psellus recounts a perfect example of the ambiguity of imperial entrances 
during civil wars. In 1047, Emperor Constantine IX ‘Monomachus’ faced an attempt on his 
throne by his cousin, Leo Tornicius, who marched on Constantinople at the head of a 
substantial army of professional soldiers. According to Psellus, Constantine had only a 
handful of honorary mercenary bodyguards available and the armies loyal to him were 
stationed on the relatively distant eastern frontier of the empire. Worse still, Constantine was 
then in the throes of debilitating attack of gout and virtually bedridden.
130
 
 Under these conditions, only one resource was available to Constantine: the city 
walls. Psellus writes that Constantine immediately recognized that his “safety depended upon 
one thing only—the circle of walls around him—and it was on the walls that he expended his 
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efforts, building up the parts which had been allowed by negligence to fall into disrepair and 
planting his stone-throwing machines thick on the ramparts.”
131
 
 From this point onward, Psellus’s narrative hinges primarily on Tornicius and 
Constantine’s respective attempts to convince, encourage and intimidate the citizens of 
Constantinople into opening or barring the gates of the city’s formidable triple walls. From 
the beginning, Psellus tells us that Tornicius and his allies marched on the capital in the firm 
belief that “the inhabitants of Constantinople would not remain loyal; they expected no 
opposition there, because the emperor had made himself unpopular by introducing reforms 
which curbed the liberty of the citizens.”
132
 
 Tornicius’s sought to sway the capital’s citizens by presenting himself as a man better 
capable of fulfilling the ideals of imperial guardianship, “a soldier emperor, a man who 
would endanger his own life on their behalf and put an end to barbarian incursions.”
133
 
Tornicius deployed argument and the display of military might to support this claim, all the 
while holding the threat of an actual siege in earnest over the citizens’ heads. 
 Byzantine military manuals recommend that a besieger do everything in his power to 
make his force look as large, fearsome and glorious as possible to intimidate defenders. 
Maurice’s Strategikon offers the following advice for attackers, 
Try to have soldiers who present a handsome physical appearance and whose horses 
are nicely equipped get as close to the enemy fortifications as they can safely do and 
let the besieged get a good look at them. Keep the less impressive troops farther off 
with the supplies, far enough distant that the people within the walls cannot come to 
any judgment about the men or the animals, but will think they are all men and of the 
same quality they had seen earlier by the walls. It is also a good idea to get the 
besieged to believe that we have a large number of armed men; to do this make the 
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men who do not have coats of mail wear the mail hoods of those who do, so that from 
a distance it will look as though they too are wearing mail. We should set up our 
camp far enough away to get them to believe that all the objects they see in it are 
really soldiers.
134
 
In Psellus’s narrative, Tornicius employs a number of these manipulative techniques. For one 
he set up his troops “all in position before the walls, not in a confused mob, nor massed 
together in one great body, but disposed in a soldier-like manner and giving every sign of 
readiness for battle.”
135
 To frighten the civilian defenders who “had no experience of war,” 
and in direct accordance with Maurice’s Strategikon, “every man wore armor,” although 
Psellus notes that some outfits were noticeably more complete than others.
136
 The overall 
rebel formation also seemed tailored to appear as large as possible: Tornicius spread out his 
men in small groups to take up as much ground as possible.
137
 Psellus also provides us with 
evidence that Tornicius may have put his best men forward and hidden his least impressive, 
noting the appearance behind the main body of the besiegers of a “great multitude, which to 
those on the wall seemed countless, for they too had been divided into small groups.” This 
far group however, at least when it moved, unlike the armored, disciplined soldiers brought 
near to the wall for close analysis by the defenders, “gave the impression not so much of a 
strong army as of a disordered mob.”
138
 In this description Tornicius’s military deployment 
seems to have been as much about performance as tactics. It is a calculated show of might 
aimed specifically to sway an audience of civilians watching from the city ramparts. 
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 Tornicius’s claim to be a competent soldier-emperor was backed up by his own 
performance as well as the performance of his army as a whole. According to Psellus, 
Tornicius was highly active before the eyes of the defenders, supervising every action of his 
men upon horseback, finally riding up to the gates on a white horse, at the exact center of his 
massive formation flanked by his best knights.
139
 
 This awesome show of power had an evident effect on the Constantinopolitan 
citizens: “Amazement and confusion reigned everywhere, and it seemed the entire city would 
fall an easy prey to the enemy.”
140
 Psellus refers at length to the visual force of the besiegers: 
how each element of their deployment was specifically laid out before the defenders’ fearful 
eyes. 
 Constantine lacked the resources to match this performance of power, but 
nevertheless made the effort to make public appearances to remind both his own people and 
the enemy “that he was still alive” by appearing on one the balconies of the palace 
overlooking the walls, hiding his crippling illness as best he could.
141
 The visibility of both 
imperial candidates to the viewers on the walltop is a crucial element. 
An auditory contest was just as important as the visual. The rebel troops within 
earshot of the wall began by attempting to persuade the defenders to change their allegiance. 
Their first move was to remind the defenders on the wall of the dreadful things they 
had suffered at the emperor's hands. They brought to their notice the alleviation that 
would result from his capture, the sufferings that would follow his continued 
freedom. This information was proffered at different parts of the wall in turn. They 
begged the defenders to open the gates to them and receive within their city a 
sovereign who was kindly and merciful, one who would treat them with humanity and 
bring new glory to the Roman Empire by waging victorious wars against the 
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barbarians.
142
 
The defenders, however, rejected these offers. Rather than opening the gates and rejoicing, 
they “poured forth a torrent of abuse with all manner of disgraceful epithets, both on them 
and on their pretender.”
143
 Psellus provides us with a clue as to why Tornicius’s argument 
fell flat when he tells us that the old men and veterans in the city were stunned to see a rebel 
daring enough to lay siege to the capital with artillery and archers.
144
 This at least hints that 
by directing an army against the capital, Tornicius damaged his claim to act as a legitimate 
emperor, who ought to defend the god-guarded city, not prepare to storm its divinely 
protected walls. 
 From the initial jeering refusal of the people, persuasion was abandoned in favor of 
an escalating duel of words and weapons alike. The rebels responded to the citizens’ insults 
of Tornicius by attacking Constantine’s character in crude terms. Finally, open conflict broke 
out when a group of townsmen rode outside the walls and attempted to drive the rebels back 
with arrows and slings. The disciplined rebels however, feigned retreat and then turned on 
the townsfolk, driving them back inside the walls in chaos. One rebel horse archer even 
attempted to win the conflict in one stroke, firing an arrow directly at the imperial booth, 
which the emperor managed to dodge but which killed a courtier. The emperor was 
nevertheless forced to watch the battle from a more distant balcony, ceding the ground to 
Tornicius before everyone’s eyes. 
 Interestingly, in the narrative that follows, there is a tension between the practical task 
of winning the engagement and the attempt to fulfill imperial ideals. For example, the gout-
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ridden Constantine made the fanciful decision to abandon the strength of the walls and sally 
outside the gates with his force of civilians, honor guards and armed convicts to attack 
Tornicius’s disciplined army because it would be “disgraceful” if a true emperor failed to 
meet a usurper in open battle.
145
 According to imperial ideals, after all, an emperor was 
supposed to ride up and rescue cities by destroying usurpers, not cower inside the walls with 
them. After the unsurprising rout of Constantine’s makeshift militia, however, Tornicius too 
fell prey to quixotic ideals. 
 After the militia’s defeat, they not only fled, but also abandoned the walltop and the 
gates, fleeing to their homes, thinking defeat inevitable. Tornicius was given the perfect 
opportunity to enter: 
There was nothing to prevent the enemy’s getting inside the fortifications: the prize 
was there to be taken with impunity. The officers in charge at the wall-gates had 
already abandoned their guard, while they looked for some place to give them shelter. 
Throughout the city were men on the way back to their homes, or men who 
contemplated going over to the pretender.
146
 
According to Psellus, what happened next demonstrated the power of imperial ideals of 
legitimacy over utilitarian calculations. Tornicius refused to enter the unguarded gates 
because he desired to enter not as a besieger, but as a rightful monarch. For him at the very 
least, the legitimacy of passage was something he could not confer upon himself and usurp, 
but that had to be conferred upon him by the consent of the people. He might stoop to 
intimidating the citizenry by force, but he sought a surrender, not a conquest. 
Tornicius shirked the final entry. Perhaps it would be truer to say that he was 
confidently awaiting our invitation to make him emperor; he expected to be led up to 
the palace preceded by torches, in a procession worthy of a sovereign. So he put off 
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his entry to the morrow.
147
 
Tornicius was confident, however, that his victory had guaranteed him such an invitation, 
and was quick to play the part of the magnanimous ruler, sparing all of the townsmen his 
men had captured and ordering that “the murder of their kinsmen” must end.
148
 
 This intermission to the conflict gave Constantine the time he needed to shore up his 
position, repairing his walls and “currying favor with the people.” Pragmatically recognizing 
that his security lay with their continued loyalty, rather than demonstrations of his honor, he 
“showed his appreciation of their loyalty in the past, and promised them rewards, as if at the 
Games, if they continued to be faithful in the future.”
149
 
 The contest was decided the next day. Tornicius, “under the impression that the 
Empire was his for the taking,” made his bid for a popular invitation to enter, unveiling a 
dramatic exhibition of his legitimacy. Advancing in person to the walls on horseback, he 
brought forward his prisoners from the earlier battle, “loaded with chains,” each placed some 
distance from each other so a greater portion of the townsfolk on the walls could see them, 
“stirring pity by their cries as well as by their gestures.” These prisoners, “had been 
instructed what to say at the appointed moment” and at Tornicius’s signal, made a plea for 
the wall’s surrender, ignoring the emperor completely and focusing entirely upon the people. 
To the emperor they said nothing, but addressed their remarks to the people. They 
begged them not to treat with contempt men of their own race and their own families, 
nor bear to watch themselves, a pitiable sight, being hacked into pieces before their 
very eyes, like victims at a sacrifice. They warned us not to tempt Providence by 
making light of a sovereign such as the world had never seen before, one whom they 
themselves knew well by experience. He could have destroyed them even then, they 
said, and he could have treated them as enemies, but no, -- till that moment he had put 
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off the massacre, sparing their lives in order to do us a favor. Thereupon, by way of 
contrast, they gave a dramatic account of the terrible deeds of our ruler. They 
described how in the beginning of his reign he had raised very high the hopes of the 
city, only to bring us down from the clouds to the edge of a precipice. Such were the 
main points touched on by these prisoners.
150
 
This disturbing display of power and mercy is highly reminiscent of the plea made by the 
repentant Antiochene rebels to Theodosius II hundreds of years before. Both juxtapose the 
power and just right of the legitimate emperor to destroy his ungrateful subjects if he wished 
with his merciful restrain from doing so due to his love for those under his custody. 
However, this theatrical, emotional performance was unsuccessful, and the “people’s loyalty 
still did not waver.”
151
 
 The determinative importance of the personal performance of a would-be-emperor 
ultimately broke this stalemate. The defenders began to fire upon the rebels (it is unclear 
whether any time had elapsed between the presentation of the prisoners or whether they had 
been withdrawn yet) even though the latter were out of range. However, by straining one of 
the stone-throwing machines too far, a group of defenders managed to send a particularly 
large stone directly at Tornicius. The stone missed him, “but so frightened him and his staff 
that they took to their heels.” Furthermore, “the panic and confusion caused among them by 
this one incident not only broke their ranks but made them retire to their own rampart.”
152
 
 Stunningly, this “one event marked the change in their fortunes.”
153
 The rebels, 
unlikely to get the chance of another unopposed entrance, having failed to win the loyalty of 
the citizen defenders and finally having experienced the shameful retreat of their claimant, 
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began to retreat and disperse, conceding the arena of conflict before the wall and ultimately 
fleeing the city’s environs in disorder. Meanwhile, Constantine, remembering his earlier 
repulse, did not attempt to follow the rebels, but rather awaited the return of the loyal eastern 
armies. Tornicius attempted to besiege a number of fortresses in the immediate area, but his 
viability in the eyes of his followers and foes alike had disintegrated and his army melted 
away “cursing” his name. His failure at the theater of the gate had proved him an illegitimate 
usurper, not a legitimate emperor, and consequently his following evaporated. 
 Now, with his position secure, it was Constantine’s turn to play the magnanimous 
emperor by offering clemency to the rebels, except for Tornicius and another rebel leader, 
who suffered a dismal encore before Constantinople’s walls when the emperor, observing the 
arrival of his foe, determined to violate his clemency in their two cases, condemning both to 
death. Afterwards, Constantine decided to confirm his mastery of the city and its walls with a 
lavish triumph.
154
 
 We must certainly make some allowance for the agenda of Michael Psellus, an 
experienced, literate courtier. His testimony is vivid, dramatic and full of deliberate 
oppositions, such as the respective reactions of Constantine and Tornicius to a projectile 
aimed at their person. However, Psellus is also a historian famous for his balanced, 
psychologically complex portraits of emperors. His Chronographia certainly fails if its a 
paean to Constantine IX, who is painted on the one hand as a well-meaning, spirited man 
who took his responsibilities seriously, but also as a ruler whose inconstant temperament and 
inability to judge character jeopardized his relationships with his subordinates and impaired 
his virtues.
155
 Moreover, Psellus was an actual eyewitness to the events he describes, making 
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his emphasis on the visual and auditory constraints imposed by the wall especially 
authoritative. 
 Psellus’s grudge match between imperial candidates demonstrates the determinative 
role townsfolk could play from a walltop. Just as when a city was threatened with invasion, 
citizens had to determine whether to open their gates or close them in allegiance to the 
reigning emperor, but in this case, the besieger also claimed their rightful allegiance. The 
course of the entire engagement was based heavily upon the loyalty of the townsfolk, and the 
primary means of influencing this loyalty were the respective performances of both 
candidates and their ability to fulfill ideals. Indeed, both emperors are so concerned with 
winning this allegiance that they occasionally miss opportunities to solve their problems by 
more practical means, most notably when Tornicius forbears forcing entrance through 
unguarded gates. 
 Not all would-emperors were as forbearing as Tornicius. Only a matter of decades 
after his 1040 repulse, the future emperor Alexios Komnenos approached the walls of 
Constantinople at the head of a rebel army.
156
 However, in her Alexiad, Anna Komnena 
portrays her father’s entrance into the city as far more cynical. When Alexios approached the 
city, the sitting emperor had a number of disciplined units of mercenaries available, including 
the Varangian guard, which was famously composed of globetrotting Scandinavian émigrés 
and adventurers. In this case, where no local townsfolk manned the wall, they had little 
influence over events. In light of this fact, Alexios did not undertake to win the loyalty of the 
entire complement of defenders by a grand public exhibition of his legitimacy and power, but 
only to quietly suborn a single unit of mercenaries into opening a gate under their jurisdiction 
at a crucial moment. 
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 While, as with Tornicius, Alexios’s entrance depended upon securing the loyalty of 
wall defenders, Alexios did not seek or gain the kind of triumphal, legitimate invitation 
Tornicius held out in the hope of. One of his loyal subordinates, George Palaiologos simply 
covertly climbed the wall in the middle of the night, waited with the traitorous unit until 
daylight, and then, when Alexios’s army marched on the wall armored for battle, flung open 
the gates.
157
 
 However, a forced entrance could bring political consequences, because like any 
other entry made by violence and not public consent, it was bound to leave troops free to 
plunder and ravage at will. While Tornicius’s forbearance served as a public display of his 
mercy, Alexios’s cold-blooded incursion produced inauspicious results. 
Once inside they [the Komnenan troops] scattered in all directions, in the main 
streets, at crossroads and in alleyways, in their cruelty sparing neither houses nor 
churches nor even the most sacred sanctuaries; in fact they gathered from them heaps 
of booty. They did refrain from murder, but all other crimes were committed with 
complete and reckless disregard for decency. What was worse was the fact that even 
the native-born soldiers did not abstain from such excesses; they seemed to forget 
themselves, debasing their normal habits and shamelessly following the example of 
the barbarians.
158
 
As this harsh verdict issued from the pen of Alexios Komnenos’s own daughter, whose deep 
concern with authoring a balanced biography aside, had every reason to downplay the savage 
commencement of her father’s reign, is damning indeed. 
An emperor who actively besieged an imperial city jeopardized his performance as a 
benevolent protector of cities, and indeed risked appearing as the very thing he claimed to 
oppose: a barbarian violator of urban space and an enemy of Christian Roman civilization. 
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 As strongly as they distinguished urban and outside space, Byzantines distinguished 
legitimate and illegitimate passage through walls. The distinction was founded upon the 
welcome of the emperor by the city: the celebratory opening of the gates to him. An 
illegitimate entrance was one made by force after the closure of the gates: the violation of the 
wall. The opening or closure of the gates symbolized the will of the city, whoever was 
responsible for the choice. Emperors sought legitimate entrances and avoided illegitimate 
ones. Indeed, in the late Antique period, a would-be-emperor actually needed to receive 
invitations to enter and be proclaimed emperor from the gate of each city he passed to be 
considered legitimate by all of them.
159
 Indeed, even after imperial authority was definitively 
centered around entrances in Constantinople, the willingness of some other city to open its 
gates to a usurper built a case for his legitimacy and the refusal of some town to play along 
and open their gates could stop an attempted coup in its tracks. 
 Byzantine culture and political theory certainly strongly distinguished between legal 
and illegal passage into urban space. The only legitimate place to pass through the city wall 
was at the city gates. The Digest of Justinian makes the distinction in unequivocal terms: 
…. It is an offense punishable with capital punishment to violate city walls, for 
example, by moving up ladders and climbing over or by any other means. It is 
unlawful for Roman citizens to use any other egress than the portals; for to do so is a 
hostile act and an abomination.
160
 
In the Digest, violation of the wall transforms the violator into an enemy of society. As 
described before, despite the occasional classical allusion to some particularly doughty 
character as a “Breaker of Walls” and the heroic portrayal of Byzantine armies that conquer 
foreign cities, the violators of good Christian, Roman cities are demonic figures in Byzantine 
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literature. In his description of the 904 Arab attack on Thessaloniki, John Kaminiates labels 
the lead Arab besieger an “untamable beast,” a “felon” who “flaunted a style of behavior 
singularly appropriate to the wild animal after which he was named and for whose ferocious 
ways and ungovernable temper he was more than a match.”
161
 When narrating the 614 
Persian Sack of Jerusalem Antiochus Strategos writes of the Persian soldiers that “they 
entered in a mighty wrath, gnashing their teeth in violent fury; like evil beasts they roared, 
bellowed like lions, hissed like ferocious serpents, and slew all whom they found. Like mad 
dogs they tore with their teeth the flesh of the faithful, and respected none at all, neither male 
nor female, neither young nor old, neither child nor baby, neither priest nor monk, neither 
virgin nor widow…”
162
 In Byzantine terms, to break a wall, to publically violate sacred space 
and prosecute aggression on those within was an illegitimate, criminal and even inhuman act, 
at least when suffered by a Byzantine city. 
 It was very much possible for an emperor who besieged his own cities to end up 
branding himself as a bestial tyrant. Niketas Choniates’s Annals, which cover the century 
leading up to the traumatic 1204 Sack of Constantinople as well as the event’s immediate 
aftermath, emphatically labels Andronikos I (reign 1183-85) a tyrant due to his savage sieges 
of his own cities. 
 According to Choniates, in 1184 the populations of several cities, including the 
Nicaeans, Prusaens, Lopadians and later the Thessalonicans rose in revolt against 
Andronikos’ rule. While Choniates already considers Andronikos a tyrant due to his bloody, 
usurpation of the throne through the murder of the ten-year-old emperor Alexios II, the 
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Dowager Empress Maria and a string of powerful nobles, his description of these sieges is 
one of his most lengthy exhibit of the emperor’s tyrannical behavior.  
 For Choniates, Andronikos’ willingness to violate city walls and subject the civilians 
of Nicaea, Prusa and Lopadion to massacre, plunder and torture brands him an animalistic, 
demonic enemy of Christian Roman society. As we have described, in ordinary warfare the 
fate of a captured city was likely to be worse the longer it had held out. Worst of all, a city 
taken by force was deprived of all ability to regulate their surrender through negotiation, and 
indeed, officers and commanders were often entirely incapable of preventing their men from 
engaging in a violent sack in such a case, even if they wished to do so. 
 In Choniates’s narrative, Andronikos consistently subjects his rebellious cities to a 
sack. In the case of Prusa which refused to surrender and had its walls broken by siege 
engines, Andronikos committed a widespread massacre both of the noble leaders and of the 
general population. Niketas explicitly states that Andornikos’s treatement of the Prusaeans, 
while perhaps in accord with the law of war, invalidated his legitimacy as emperor. 
Andronikos entered the city and lodged within, but he did not conduct himself as a 
meek emperor and savior before the Prusaeans, who were former and future subjects 
even though they had rebelled for a time, but like a ravenous lion falling on unpenned 
and shepherdless flocks, he broke the neck of one, devoured, the inward parts of 
another and did even worse things to a third; the rest he scattered in the direction of 
cliffs and mountains and chasms. In this fashion did Andronikos behave. Since there 
had been no preceding formal compact or truce with the citizenry of Prusa, nor had a 
voluntary surrender been negotiated, and as the city had been taken by force, he 
utterly ruined and destroyed the vast majority, portioning out his savage anger in 
manifold and diverse punishments.
163
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In this passage, it is explicitly Andronikos’s treatment of Prusa as a hostile foreign city as 
though he was on campaign against the Arabs that de-legitimizes his authority. The ordinary 
dynamics of siege warfare are complicated by the additional definitions of civil warfare. 
 Indeed, the line between a civil war and a foreign invasion was often hazy: foreign 
armies and pretenders often cooperated, making the distinction between a legitimate ruler 
with foreign backing and a foreign aggressor manipulating a puppet ruler an ambiguous one. 
For example, according to Anna Komnena, the Norman leader Robert Guiscard 
framed his 1081 Norman invasion of the empire’s Balkan territories as a campaign to restore 
the rightful emperor Michael Doukas to the throne. The politics of the situation are complex: 
a Michael Doukas had indeed been emperor from 1071 to 1078, at which time he was 
overthrown by one of his generals, Nikephoros Botaneiates, who was in turn overthrown in 
1081 by Alexios Komnenos, Anna’s father. The real Michael Doukas had been Robert 
Guiscard’s father in law, giving the Norman a pretext for involvement, but according to 
Anna, in this tumultuous political climate it was difficult to tell whether the man the 
Normans presented truly was or was not the former emperor. 
 Regardless of the truth, the ability of Robert to characterize his invasion as a 
restoration hinged upon the presentation of “Michael” before the walls of Dyrrakhion, a 
highly strategic city on the Adriatic coast that the Normans were besieging. In Anna’s 
narrative, the event began when the people of the city started to suspect that the Norman 
incursion was more than a temporary raid and their commander, George Palaiologos, put the 
question to the Norman besiegers from the walltop. 
Palaiologos ordered the question to be put from top of the walls why he had come. 
‘To restore Michael, my kinsman, back to the throne from which he was deposed, to 
his correct office; to punish the outrages inflicted on him; in a word, to avenge him.’ 
Palaiologos’ men gave their reply: ‘If we see Michael and recognize him, we will 
without hesitation make obeisance before him and surrender the town.’ Hearing this, 
Robert at once gave orders that “Michael” should be dressed in magnificent robes 
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and displayed to the citizens. He was led out with an imposing escort, loudly 
acclaimed with all kinds of musical instruments and cymbals, and shown to them. As 
soon as they saw him, a thousand insults rained down on him from above; he was a 
complete stranger, they yelled.
164
 
The presentation of “Michael” shows the ambiguity such pieces of political theater often had. 
On the one hand, it appears to have been unsuccessful in the immediate sense: the defenders 
reject his authority and respond with jeering and insults. Proper imperial pomp was clearly 
insufficient to overawe the defenders into surrender. 
 On the other hand, the defenders do confess that should the actual Michael Doukas be 
produced, they would have to submit to him over Alexios Komnenos, who was undeniably a 
usurper. Moreover, while the commander Palaiologos’s men appear to have been able to 
steer the responses of the defenders on the walltop, the event had a broader audience. Anna 
relates that many Byzantines from other areas began to go over to ‘Michael’ after his 
appearance at Dyrrackhion. In her words, “countless forces as thick as winter snowflakes 
were rallying around him [Robert Guiscard] from all directions and the more frivolous folk, 
believing that the pretender Michael was in truth the emperor, were joining him.”
165
 Indeed 
the pretender gained enough support that Alexios was forced to seek alliances with the Turks 
and the Venetians to burgeon his depleted forces.
166
 
 It is easy to see how the possession of a pretender could be useful to a foreign 
invader. The hope that cities might surrender even to a foreign-backed claimant was often 
justified. Anna Komnena records how during the reign of her father the Cumans invaded the 
Balkans armed with a man claiming to be the son of Emperor Romanos IV Diogenes 
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(reigned 1068-71), having “decided to march in full force against the Roman Empire, on the 
pretext of re-establishing him on the ancestral throne.”
167
 
 This strategy quickly achieved success: at the city of Goloe “the inhabitants threw 
into chains the commander of the garrison and handed him over to the Cumans, whom they 
welcomed with cries of joy.” This single surrender had a domino effect, and “the people of 
the neighboring towns, Diampolis and the rest, however, saw the Cumans had gained 
possession of Goloe; they therefore capitulated, welcomed them with pleasure, surrendered 
and what is more, acclaimed pseudo-Diogenes.”
168
 Even if Anna may have exaggerated the 
“joy” of these cities, and made no mention of any fear that might have motivated their 
surrenders, her narrative reveals the murkiness that the presence of multiple imperial 
candidates might lend to the ordinary task of urban defense.  
 Urban surrenders often followed such a domino pattern: if an imperial candidate or 
commander proved he could conquer one strongly fortified city by force or that he  could 
convince its population or leaders of his own legitimacy, a whole slew of nearby cities were 
likely to open their gates without a fight. This pattern is attested to by multiple sources: John 
of Nikiu describes how when the Byzantine general Nicetas succeeded in forcing one city 
loyal to a ‘usurper’ to surrender, all the cities of the province followed suit. “And Nicetas 
directed a combined and powerful attack on the city of Manûf and compelled it to open its 
gates. Then all the cities of Egypt sent in their submission to him.”
169
  
In ordinary warfare a commander who made faithless promises would soon find 
himself unable to convince other cities to surrender, his unreliability having been 
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demonstrated. However, in civil warfare he would also certainly forfeit any claim to be a 
rightful liege. Niketas Choniates describes how during the Latin invasion of the empire after 
the 1204 Sack of Constantinople, the Venetians and Crusaders attempted to pose Baldwin of 
Flanders as a legitimate Byzantine Emperor, achieving a good number of surrenders but 
ultimately facing resistance due to their failure not only to act as a good liege but even to 
remain faithful to their treaties as would be expected of a foreign invader with the smallest 
shred of honor. 
 When the duty of a rightful emperor to defend city walls was elevated to an explicitly 
religious duty, such ideals could become powerful weapons. For example, one strategy used 
to placate enemies was the performance of Christian ritual and devotion on the walltop. 
Byzantine history is rife with anecdotes in which the procession of an icon around the 
parapet results in the miraculous deliverance of the city. While the prospect of divine 
intervention was purely wishful thinking, if the attacker claimed imperial legitimacy or even 
identified as a Christian, it made attacking the walls not only a political faux pas, but a 
sacrilegious crime against God. According to Niketas Choniates, many cities made 
declarations of Christian piety when threatened by either Christian invaders such as the 
Crusaders or by tyrannical emperors such as Andronikos. 
 Some cities offered surrender without any acceptance of passage or opening of gates, 
or otherwise qualified the opening, for example by accepting the entrance of the leaders but 
denying the entrance to the unreliable bulk of the besieging army. 
When Henry, the brother of the new Latin “emperor” of Constantinople, warned the 
“inhabitants” of the Greek city of Orestias that he would never abandon a siege unless they 
“came to terms” or he defeated them by “the law of warfare,” the inhabitants refused to 
negotiate. According to Niketas, Henry had recently sacked the city of Apros, which had 
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surrendered peacefully and “behaved savagely towards its inhabitants, giving them over to 
slaughter as though the slain were sheep or cattle.”
170
 The townsfolk of neighboring Orestias 
were not quick to forget this. 
At the mere mention of treaties, the inhabitants responded in vexation that henceforth 
Romans wound never trust in oaths sworn to by Latins because the Latins were 
absolutely untrustworthy in the assurances they gave and treated those who went over 
to them with brutality; the Romans had come to know them to be most merciless to 
captives of war.
171
 
Henry pressed the siege of Orestias, but the citizens, having no other option, put up a 
vigorous defense, resisting on the battlements and mounting a number of bold sallies, 
destroying Henry’s siege weapons and killing many of his most important officers. 
Ultimately, the supplies of the besiegers ran out and their camp was struck with disease, and 
the siege had to be lifted. 
 In many of these examples it might appear that when considering whether to open or 
close their gates that in most cases cities made a single choice and stuck with it. However, 
there are numerous examples of cities drastically changing their reception of a representative 
of imperial authority, shifting their stance as the situation changed and based on the actions 
of a claimant. 
An anecdote recounted by the seventh-century historian Theophylact Simocatta 
establishes the power of citizens to defend their interests with their walls by tailoring the 
reception to the degree of legitimacy they believed an imperial representative’s actions 
merited. 
 Simocatta describes how in 594, the Emperor Maurice’s brother, Peter, campaigned 
to expel a substantial force of Sclavene barbarian from the empire’s Balkan provinces. 
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According to Simocatta, after Peter’s initial victories against the Sclavenes, the Byzantine 
cities along his march competed to receive and entertain their distinguished rescuer. While 
Simocatta describes Peter as more interested in pressing his military advantage than being the 
guest of honor at local feast days, Peter accepted several such invitations. 
 The political ritualization of entrance and exit is illustrated by the reception granted 
Peter by the city of Asemus. According to Simocatta, 
When the inhabitants of the city had learned that the general was expected, they came 
out of the city to meet Peter, and made his arrival at the city splendid. From bygone 
times a garrison had been organized in this city for the protection of the citizens, since 
the barbarians swooped down like lightning around this city quite frequently. 
Accordingly, when the garrison stationed in this city learned that the general was 
about to arrive, they took up the standards, which Romans call bands, and went out of 
the city; then, arrayed in armour, they welcomed the general most gloriously.
172
 
This martial welcome of Peter by the citizens of Asemus evokes Roman traditions and is 
simultaneously a display of civic pride and a declaration of loyalty to the Byzantine state as 
represented by Peter. So far, the imperial government’s authority over urban populations 
appears to be not only unquestioned but even actively celebrated. 
However, Peter’s next actions revealed that the citizens of Asemus held a far more 
nuanced, contractual view of imperial power that belied their declarations of unquestioning 
submission. According to Simocatta, the city’s presentation of their dapper garrison had an 
unintended consequence: the campaign-preoccupied Peter was so impressed with the 
“magnificence of the city’s soldiers” that he “attempted to remove them from the city and 
include them amongst his own forces.”
173
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The citizens and the garrison rejected this demand and in doing so articulated and 
defended a particular view of the community’s military and political position. Since the 
empire’s strategic situation relied upon the capacity of cities to fend for themselves for a 
substantial stretch of time with minimal state assistance, the possession of a strong garrison 
(while expensive) might ensure a city’s survival. Simocatta corresponds to this view writing 
that Asemus merited a permanent garrison “since the barbarians swooped down like lightning 
around this city quite frequently.”
174
 
To this end, the city rejected Peter’s demand by appealing to a higher authority and 
“the citizens and the city’s garrison produced a decree of the emperor Justin which granted 
the city this successive armed protection.”
175
 When Peter, then encamped outside the city 
walls, ignored this defense, things quickly escalated. The garrison took refuge in the city’s 
church. Peter ordered the bishop to expel them but the bishop refused, at which point Peter 
sent a party of soldiers to drag the garrison out by force, at which point the garrison troops 
armed themselves and began to fortify the sanctuary against assault. The soldiers were turned 
back by the garrison’s barricades and by their unwillingness to violate sacred ground. 
Finally, Peter sought to have the recalcitrant bishop dragged outside the city “in dishonor” to 
the camp, at which point the citizens had had enough and undid their grand welcome with a 
correspondingly powerful rejection. According to Simocatta, 
When the citizens had witnessed this, they all assembled together and forcibly thrust 
out of the city the man dispatched by the general against the priest; after closing the 
gates in the wall, they hymned the emperor with acclamations and covered the 
general with insults. Peter was encamped in a fortified enclosure about a mile from 
the city. But since his enterprise was disgraceful, he left the city and proceeded to 
                                                 
174
 Simocatta, History, 182. 
175
 Simocatta, History, 182. 
 
99 
march forwards, escorted by great curses from the city.
176
 
The disparity between Peter’s welcome and his rejection could hardly be more glaring. He is 
received with formal celebration and expelled with rude curses. 
If Peter’s reception was obliquely associated with the city’s walls, they were the 
explicit scene of his rebuff. Indeed, while the welcome might be considered almost an 
entirely formal ceremony, the rejection has teeth in the form of a forcible expulsion and the 
barring of the city gates. Indeed, the closing of the gates must be seen as to some degree a 
military as well as political act. 
Of course, the citizens were careful not to formally reject imperial authority: their 
repulse was justified by an imperial decree and their curses of an actual government 
representative were mingled with praises to the emperor himself. Their response was 
sophisticated and prudent, both conservative and subversive. 
In Simocatta’s narrative, the city walls are stages at which the citizens broadcast their 
allegiance. In both the positive and the negative, the display is described as collective, 
involving the body of citizens, and as taking place at the city gate. Even if we grant a 
leadership role in these events to local aristocrats or the city’s bishop, the story of Peter and 
Asemus visibly contradicts the assertion that walls are instruments used by the state to 
control civilians. Here a community expressed and asserted its own interests through and by 
its walls. 
 In the example of Asemus, the character of the reception Peter receives was 
intimately related to Peter’s ability to fulfill ideals of imperial leadership in the eyes of the 
townsfolk. When the citizens saw him as an effective protector, the gates were opened in 
festive welcome.  But when he threatened to weaken the city’s defenses and furthermore 
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violated law and religion to do so, he became a tyrant, and the closure of the gates was a just 
act.
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8. Conclusion 
 
Byzantine city walls need to be understood as functional political structures. 
Historians have traditionally viewed Byzantine city walls as means by which the state 
controlled Byzantine citizens and populations, but the relationship was often quite the 
opposite. While historians have examined several aspects of walls, such as their role in 
economic regulation, imperial propaganda and military defense, only recently have scholars 
have begun to analyze in any depth the most important function of walls: the selective 
regulation of entrance. 
Entering or exiting a city wall was an important event with military and political 
dimensions. Historians have indeed analyzed this aspect, but focused heavily upon the way 
walls regulated the daily life and commerce of ordinary people. In this sense, walls are 
understood to be oppressive, regulatory structures that enforce property divisions, state 
oversight of markets and generally legitimate the dominant elite. 
Byzantine city walls were first and foremost fortifications in a literal sense: structures 
built by one set of people to protect themselves from another. A city wall, however, 
performed the task of a fortification in a particular way: like a cell membrane, it entirely 
enclosed a given space and selectively regulated passage into and out of it. In doing so, a city 
wall created and maintained a secure space for a given community and its rules, culture and 
resources. Emperors claimed authority over this passage, but required the acceptance of 
whoever held the gate to do so. Walls were not static but alive because judgment was 
required in gatekeeping both individually and collectively. While we generally think of walls 
as structures states use to control people, walls actually allowed people to control rulers. In 
Byzantine history, the ability of communities to control the function of their own walls was a 
 
102
significant issue at the very highest levels of politics. 
Walls were political arenas in which civilians negotiated imperial authority by force, 
performance and persuasion. Since the imperial monarchy zealously maintained a monopoly 
over all political and military activity, citizens had to operate within the confines of this 
monopoly. Byzantine citizens were careful to justify their participation in military and 
political activity on walls. A profession of loyalty to rightful imperial authority invariably 
accompanied rejection of any actual representative of imperial authority, from a minor 
official to the emperor himself. Communities also carefully fit acts of collective defense into 
legitimate narratives, such as saintly intervention or valiant soldierly heroism. Communities 
presented the most blatantly rebellious acts as the most steadfastly orthodox, hoping that 
whoever ended up on the throne in Constantinople would accept the story. 
While city walls are virtually extinct in the modern world, for almost ten thousand 
years, from the Neolithic development of agriculture to the beginning of the modern era, they 
were ubiquitous, encircling cities from West Africa to China. The walled city, with its 
surrounding constellation of agricultural villages, was the basic unit of human civilization. 
As historians, it is important for us to understand how city walls informed and affected 
human activity without being prejudiced by our very limited experience with entirely 
different contemporary species of barriers. 
I could have deployed my thesis that walls could be instruments of communal 
political decisions in respect to a great many periods and regions more congenial than the 
Byzantine Empire. For example, if I made this argument for ancient Greek city-states or late 
medieval Italian towns, my task would have been a far simpler one. In these places, walls 
were often trumpeted as permanent protectors of communal liberty, or else the power of a 
fairly broad local elite class. Sources have no qualms about discussing exactly how city walls 
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could limit central authority. However, by placing my thesis in context of the Byzantine 
Empire, I believe I have demonstrated that towns could use their walls even when they lived 
in a political world in which such action could be considered criminal. If communal use of 
walls can be revealed even beneath the jealous, authoritarian gaze of Byzantine Emperors, 
the politics of the gate may be a dynamic truly fundamental to the walled city. 
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